Saturday, September 12, 2026

When Administration Forgets the Family: The Civilizational Cost of Governing the Isolated Individual




Modern administration has learned to see the individual with extraordinary precision.

It can identify her through an Aadhaar number, place her within an income category, determine her age, educational status, employment profile and eligibility for welfare. It can recognise the student, the patient, the pensioner, the worker, the farmer, the woman, the child and the beneficiary.

But it struggles to see the person.

Because a person is never merely an individual.

She is someone's daughter, mother, sister, wife, student, neighbour, caregiver or dependent. She inherits memories she did not create, bears obligations she did not contract into, receives care she did not purchase and will, in turn, provide care whose value may never appear in an economic ledger.

The modern administrative state encounters her primarily as a rights-bearing individual.

Indian civilization encountered her also as a being constituted by relationships.

This distinction is not semantic. It produces two very different imaginations of society.

When administration and its machinery gradually exclude the family from their understanding of human life, the problem is therefore larger than faulty policy design. What is displaced is an entire conception of what a human being is.

The Fiction of the Self-Contained Individual

The autonomous individual is indispensable to modern law.

Before the Constitution, before a court and before the state, a citizen cannot be denied dignity merely because a family, caste, community or collective claims authority over her.

This achievement must be protected.

Yet a useful legal principle can become a misleading social philosophy.

The individual who appears self-contained in law is not self-created in life.

Before anyone becomes a taxpayer, employee, voter or beneficiary, someone has fed them, held them through illness, taught them a language, transmitted habits, disciplined desires, absorbed mistakes and invested years of labour in their survival.

The supposedly independent adult stands upon an enormous inheritance of dependence.

Modern administrative systems often enter the story only after this work has been performed.

They therefore risk mistaking the visible individual for the complete human reality.

The state sees the eighteen-year-old citizen.

It does not necessarily see the eighteen years that produced the citizen.

The Indian Person Was Never Imagined in Isolation

Classical Indian thought did not generally begin with the question, "What am I entitled to as an autonomous individual?"

It more often asked: What relationships constitute me, and what follows from them?

The language was that of dharma.

Dharma could not be reduced simply to personal morality. It located human beings within an order of obligations towards parents, children, teachers, guests, ancestors, society, other beings and ultimately the larger cosmic order.

The idea of ṛṇa, indebtedness, was particularly significant.

One did not enter the world as an unencumbered being.

One was already the recipient of gifts.

Knowledge had been transmitted by teachers and seers. Life had come through parents and ancestors. Society had provided conditions for one's existence. Nature sustained the body without asking permission.

Human maturity therefore consisted not simply in claiming freedom from dependence, but in recognising the right kinds of dependence and learning how to reciprocate them.

This is one reason the gṛhastha, the householder, acquired such importance in the civilizational imagination.

The household was not understood merely as a private arrangement for romantic companionship.

It was a site of sustenance.

Children, elders, guests, students, renunciants and those unable to support themselves were all, in different ways, connected to the productive and ethical responsibilities of household life.

The family was therefore not outside society.

It was one of the principal mechanisms through which society reproduced itself.

The Household as a Civilizational Institution

It is easy to romanticise the family, and that should be avoided.

Families can become sites of domination, hierarchy, violence, exclusion and unjust control. Indian society knows this history too.

A civilizational defence of the family cannot mean allowing the language of tradition to override individual dignity.

But acknowledging pathology does not require us to misunderstand the institution itself.

Hospitals can fail patients; we do not therefore conclude that healthcare is dispensable.

Schools can oppress children; we do not therefore imagine education without institutions.

Governments can abuse power; we do not therefore abandon government.

Families too must be reformed where necessary.

But reform presupposes that something worth preserving exists.

The family remains the place where enormous quantities of economically uncompensated and administratively invisible labour are performed.

Who cares for an infant through the night?

Who takes an elderly parent to the hospital?

Who supports a young person through unemployment?

Who shelters a relative after bereavement?

Who pays for an unexpected surgery when insurance is insufficient?

Who raises a child with disability after a government scheme has completed its sanctioned intervention?

Who takes leave from work because an ageing parent can no longer remain alone?

In India, the answer remains overwhelmingly familial.

Public policy depends upon this reality even when administrative language fails to acknowledge it.

India Already Governs Through the Family But Often Unconsciously

The paradox is that the Indian state does not actually operate in a society of isolated individuals.

Much of its machinery quietly assumes the continued existence of families.

Public distribution systems think in terms of households.

Anganwadi and maternal-child health interventions depend significantly upon mothers, caregivers and local networks.

ASHA workers routinely operate not merely with patients but with households.

Schools depend on parents to ensure attendance, nutrition, homework and behavioural stability.

Health systems discharge patients into homes where relatives are expected to provide post-operative care.

Pensions sustain not only individuals but frequently entire households.

Family members remain the default caregivers for millions of older Indians.

The state therefore repeatedly relies upon the family while rarely treating the health of the family itself as a serious policy objective.

This is the contradiction.

We assume that families will continue performing essential social functions, while economic, urban and institutional structures can be designed with little concern for whether families remain capable of performing them.

The Family as India's Invisible Welfare State

Long before welfare ministries existed, families performed welfare functions.

They continue to do so.

When a young person moves to Bengaluru, Pune or Gurugram in search of employment, the first months may be sustained by parental savings.

When a business collapses, relatives may absorb debt.

When illness strikes, siblings redistribute responsibilities.

When elderly parents cannot live independently, adult children often reorganise their own lives.

When women take career breaks for childbirth or caregiving, the family absorbs consequences the labour market does not.

This is not necessarily equitable.

Indeed, much of the burden of familial care falls disproportionately on women.

That is precisely why serious policy should engage the family rather than ignore it.

If unpaid care is invisible, women become invisible with it.

A family-sensitive state would therefore not merely praise families for sacrificing.

It would ask how caregiving can be distributed more fairly and supported materially.

There is a profound difference between saying, "The family should handle it," and saying, "Because families perform socially indispensable work, public institutions must help them perform it without destroying the lives of caregivers."

The first is abandonment.

The second is subsidiarity.

Subsidiarity: What Should the State Actually Do?

A useful governing principle may be this:

What families can reasonably and humanely do, the state should enable them to do.

What families cannot do alone, the state should support.

What families should never be permitted to do is violence, coercion and neglect. This the state should prevent.

And where no viable family exists, public institutions must step in decisively.

Such an approach avoids two extremes.

The first romanticises the family and abandons vulnerable individuals within it.

The second treats the family as an inconvenient intermediary between citizen and state and gradually replaces human responsibility with bureaucracy.

Neither is desirable.

The aim should be a partnership among individual, family, community and state, with each institution performing functions appropriate to it.

Healthcare: Treating the Family as Part of the Care System

Consider healthcare.

A doctor may treat one patient, but serious illness reorganises an entire household.

Cancer treatment alters household finances.

Dementia changes the daily life of spouses and children.

A stroke may transform an earning adult into a dependent overnight.

Chronic disease imposes diets, medicine schedules, travel and monitoring upon families.

Yet healthcare systems often evaluate success primarily in clinical terms.

The operation succeeded.

The patient was discharged.

The bed became available.

What happens after discharge is treated as somebody else's problem.

A family-sensitive healthcare system would ask different questions.

Does this household possess caregiving capacity?

Does the primary caregiver understand the treatment plan?

Can a working daughter realistically accompany her parent to hospital twice a week?

Will a spouse caring for somebody with dementia receive respite?

Should caregivers receive structured counselling and training?

Can health insurance architecture recognise long-duration home-based care rather than only procedures?

The patient remains the holder of medical rights.

But the household becomes part of the care ecology.

Ageing India Will Make This Question Unavoidable

India's demographic transition will turn the family question into an increasingly urgent policy issue.

Longer lives are an achievement.

But longevity creates new forms of dependency.

An eighty-five-year-old may need help with mobility, medication, banking, medical appointments and ordinary companionship for several years.

An administrative response might build more old-age homes and professional care facilities.

Some will certainly be necessary.

But institutionalising ageing cannot become the default imagination.

Most elderly people do not merely need "eldercare services."

They need continuity.

They need familiar languages, food, neighbourhoods, rituals, memories and relationships.

Policy must therefore ask how families that wish to care for ageing parents can be helped.

Flexible employment, caregiver leave, neighbourhood day-care centres for elders, home-health assistance, geriatric support, respite services and tax architecture that acknowledges dependent parents could all become part of a serious family policy.

The choice need not be between abandoning elders to families and separating them from families.

Public infrastructure can strengthen familial care.

The Child Is Not Merely a Student

The same principle applies to education.

Modern schooling often imagines the child primarily through institutional categories: grade level, learning outcomes, attendance, competencies, assessments.

But a child inhabits two formative worlds—the school and the home.

If those worlds become hostile to one another, the child bears the consequences.

Indian education policy frequently invokes parental participation, but meaningful institutional partnership remains uneven.

A parent-teacher meeting conducted twice a year is not a philosophy of educational partnership.

A civilizational perspective would ask a deeper question:

What belongs to the school, and what belongs to the home?

A school can teach mathematics.

But habits of responsibility, speech, respect, dietary practices, attitudes to work, care for elders and the child's relationship with tradition are shaped significantly within families.

Conversely, families cannot always teach specialised disciplines, pedagogical methods or social skills required in complex modern societies.

The institutions are complementary.

Educational policy should therefore stop oscillating between parental overreach and parental irrelevance.

The objective should be cooperation in the formation of the child.

Urban Planning Is Also Family Policy

Family policy is often imagined as a small subdivision of welfare policy.

In reality, almost every major area of governance affects the family.

Consider housing.

If employment requires young adults to migrate hundreds of kilometres from parents, that is family policy.

If urban apartments become too expensive to accommodate grandparents, that is family policy.

If two-hour commutes leave parents with barely an hour with their children each day, transportation policy becomes family policy.

If neighbourhoods have no safe spaces where children and elderly people can gather, urban design becomes family policy.

If employment markets punish those who take time away for caregiving, labour policy becomes family policy.

If educational aspiration forces children to leave their towns at increasingly young ages, development policy becomes family policy.

Administration often treats these as separate departments.

Human beings experience them as one life.

Employment Cannot Pretend Workers Have No Relationships

Modern workplaces frequently operate according to an implicit fiction: the ideal worker has no dependants.

He or she can relocate anywhere, work whenever required, remain available beyond normal hours and organise domestic responsibilities privately.

But workers have children.

They have pregnancies.

They have ill parents.

They experience bereavement.

Their spouses have careers.

Their family responsibilities change across stages of life.

A genuinely family-sensitive labour framework would therefore move beyond maternity alone.

It would take paternal responsibility seriously.

It would examine caregiver leave.

It would normalise flexible arrangements where occupationally possible.

It would recognise that a society cannot simultaneously complain about declining fertility, neglected elders, stressed parents and emotionally absent families while structuring working life as though caregiving were an inconvenience.

Economic productivity ultimately depends upon social reproduction.

The worker the economy receives every morning has been fed, raised, educated, cared for and emotionally sustained somewhere.

The economy continuously consumes resources produced by the family without pricing them.

The Danger of Turning Every Human Need into a Service

There is a deeper philosophical danger here.

Whenever a social institution weakens, the administrative state is asked to replace one more of its functions.

Parents cannot care for children: create a service.

Children cannot care for parents: create a service.

Neighbours no longer know one another: create a community intervention.

People are lonely: create a helpline.

Young people have no mentors: design a mentoring scheme.

Families cannot transmit culture: develop a curriculum.

Sometimes these interventions are necessary and valuable.

But a society should notice the pattern.

Administration is increasingly asked to manufacture through programmes what relationships once generated organically.

The result is not necessarily greater humanity.

A professional caregiver can perform excellent work.

But caregiving is not identical to care.

A counsellor can help someone through loneliness.

But counselling is not friendship.

A government programme can provide nutrition to an elderly person.

It cannot give them the experience of being wanted at the family table.

Administration can deliver inputs.

Belonging cannot be distributed through a portal.

From Rights to Ṛṇa

Modern political language asks: "What are my rights?"

The Indian civilizational language adds another question:

"What do I owe?"

The second question is increasingly difficult for administrative systems because obligation is difficult to quantify.

Rights produce identifiable claimants.

Responsibilities often involve voluntary restraint, gratitude and long-duration commitments.

Yet no civilization can survive if everybody asks only the first question.

Parents possess responsibilities towards children.

Adult children acquire responsibilities towards ageing parents.

Spouses carry obligations towards one another.

Those who inherit cultural and social capital acquire responsibilities towards institutions that made such inheritance possible.

The traditional language of ṛṇa expresses something modern contractarian thinking struggles to capture: we begin life as recipients.

We are indebted before we are independent.

This does not mean debt in the financial sense.

It describes the moral structure of interdependence.

A civilization that forgets this may produce legally autonomous individuals who increasingly discover that nobody owes anybody anything.

That is not necessarily freedom.

It may become loneliness institutionalised.

A Family-Sensitive Indian State

What, then, would it mean for India to take the family seriously?

It would not require establishing one rigid model of family.

Indian families themselves have historically taken multiple forms: joint and nuclear, multigenerational households, extended kinship networks and regionally distinctive arrangements.

Nor should the state determine intimate life.

The objective should instead be to evaluate public policy through a simple additional lens:

Does this policy strengthen or weaken people's capacity to sustain durable relationships of care?

That question could be asked across ministries.

In healthcare: what happens to caregivers?

In labour: can workers fulfil responsibilities towards children and parents?

In education: how are families included in formation?

In housing: can generations remain connected?

In taxation: are substantial caregiving responsibilities recognised?

In elder policy: are families supported before institutionalisation becomes necessary?

In disability policy: is support directed only towards the individual, or also towards those sustaining daily care?

In migration and urban development: what is the social cost of separating families across vast distances?

In digital governance: is administrative convenience replacing human discretion in situations where family circumstances genuinely matter?

Such a framework would constitute not a "family ministry" alone, but a family lens across government.

India already applies gender, environmental and financial lenses to policymaking in various ways.

The family deserves comparable seriousness.

The Panchayat, Community and the Space Between Family and State

The Indian civilizational imagination also reminds us that there need not be only two entities - the individual and the centralised state.

Between them historically existed numerous intermediate institutions.

Family.

Extended kin.

Community.

Guild.

Temple.

Maṭha.

Village.

Panchayat.

Local associations.

Trusts.

These institutions mediated social life.

Modern governance sometimes weakens these intermediate structures unintentionally by assuming that every legitimate relationship must run directly between citizen and state.

But a resilient society needs institutions in between.

The state is powerful precisely because it is impersonal.

The family is valuable partly because it is personal.

Community occupies the middle space.

A sophisticated administrative order should know which kind of institution is best suited to which kind of human need.

Not everything should be centralised.

Not everything should be familial.

Not everything can be commodified.

The State Must Protect Without Replacing

There will always be circumstances where family fails.

Women experiencing domestic violence must be able to seek protection against family members.

Children experiencing abuse must not be returned to unsafe households merely in the name of family unity.

Elder abuse must be taken seriously.

People whose family rejects or abandons them must retain full claims upon society and the state.

The defence of family therefore cannot become an excuse for institutional withdrawal.

But exceptional failure should not become the template through which the ordinary family is understood.

The state's role is not to choose between individual and family.

It is to protect the individual while creating conditions in which healthy families can endure.

That balance requires far greater philosophical sophistication than either paternalism or bureaucratic individualism.

Development Without Civilizational Amnesia

India stands at an unusual historical moment.

It is urbanising rapidly.

Millions are migrating.

Households are becoming smaller.

Women are entering and aspiring towards wider professional roles.

People live longer.

Fertility is falling.

Digital technologies increasingly mediate education, work, welfare and social interaction.

These changes cannot simply be reversed, nor should all of them be.

The real question is whether modernization must necessarily carry social atomisation with it.

India need not choose between the oppressive family and the lonely individual.

It can seek a third possibility: strong individuals within strong relationships.

Economic modernization without the destruction of intergenerational bonds.

Women's autonomy without assuming that care work has no social value.

Urban mobility without regarding rootedness as backwardness.

Social welfare without converting the state into a substitute parent, child or community.

Individual rights without civilizational amnesia about obligations.

This may be one of the most important design challenges for Indian public policy in the coming decades.

The Machinery Must Remember What It Cannot Manufacture

Administration necessarily simplifies reality.

Forms require boxes.

Budgets require categories.

Schemes require beneficiaries.

Databases require identifiable units.

But society cannot ultimately be constructed in the image of the database.

A person is larger than the category through which the state encounters them.

Behind every apparently self-contained individual stands an ecology of relationships—some visible, some forgotten, some chosen and some inherited.

Those relationships perform work no ministry could entirely reproduce.

They teach affection before citizenship.

Duty before contract.

Belonging before identity documentation.

Care before entitlement.

And responsibility before administration.

A wise state should therefore know the limits of machinery.

The question is not whether government should withdraw and leave families to fend for themselves.

The question is whether public institutions can support human relationships without attempting to supersede them.

For India, this is more than social policy.

It is a civilizational question.

If we design an administrative order that recognises only autonomous individuals, we may eventually produce the society that such an administration assumes—a society of increasingly isolated persons requiring ever greater institutional intervention simply to perform the work once sustained by relationships.

The state may then become larger.

Services may multiply.

Budgets may expand.

And yet society itself may become poorer.

The alternative is neither nostalgia nor retreat.

It is to recover a basic civilizational insight:

the human being does not flourish alone.

Administration must protect the person.

But civilization must preserve the relationships that make the person possible.


Monday, August 24, 2026

Decolonisation Through Colonial Institutions: 101 Lessons in Failure from India


What happens when a civilisation attempts to recover its intellectual autonomy through institutions originally designed to reorganise its knowledge, govern its people and manufacture its elites? India offers a revealing case.

India has been politically independent for nearly eight decades. Yet some of its most persistent debates continue to revolve around decolonisation of education, law, history, language, governance, culture and knowledge.

The usual explanation is that colonialism left behind distorted histories, alien curricula and prejudiced representations of Indian civilisation. The proposed remedy therefore seems straightforward: correct the textbooks, recover forgotten thinkers, translate Sanskrit texts, introduce Indian Knowledge Systems, rename institutions, rewrite laws and place Indian figures where European ones once stood.

All of this may be necessary.

It is not sufficient.

For the deeper inheritance of colonialism lies not merely in what an institution teaches, but in what an institution is designed to do.

A university is not simply a building into which any knowledge can be inserted. A bureaucracy is not merely a collection of officials who can be given new instructions. A legal system is not merely a set of statutes whose names can be changed. Institutions possess architectures of authority, methods of classification, hierarchies of expertise, systems of reward and punishment, assumptions about knowledge and ideas about the relationship between the state and society.

That is where the Indian experiment with decolonisation becomes instructive.

We are often trying to decolonise the content while preserving the container.

And eventually, the container wins.

The colonial project was institutional before it was ideological

Colonial power did not survive for almost two centuries merely because Indians were persuaded to admire Shakespeare.

Empire was reproduced through institutions.

The colonial state surveyed land, enumerated communities, codified customs, established courts, organised police forces, standardised administration, created universities, produced examinations and trained an intermediary elite capable of operating this machinery.

Education was central to this project.

Thomas Babington Macaulay's famous Minute of 1835 proposed creating a class of intermediaries who would be, in his words, “Indian in blood and colour, but English in tastes, in opinions, in morals and in intellect.”

The significance of the statement lies less in Macaulay's personal prejudices than in the institutional strategy behind it.

Education would create a new location of authority.

Knowledge validated by the colonial university would become credentialed knowledge. Languages recognised by the state would acquire economic value. People trained in particular forms of reasoning and expression would gain access to administration, law and professional life.

The transformation therefore did not require the disappearance of Indian knowledge.

It required something subtler.

Indian knowledge could continue to exist while ceasing to determine prestige, employment, certification and institutional authority.

That distinction remains crucial today.

The university is perhaps India's clearest warning

The three presidency universities established at Calcutta, Bombay and Madras in 1857 emerged from the educational architecture developed following Wood's Despatch of 1854 and were modelled substantially on the University of London of the period. Their role was heavily affiliating and examining rather than being organised around India's older institutional forms of knowledge transmission. 

This produced a structure whose influence long outlived the Raj.

Knowledge became increasingly organised into departments.

Learning became increasingly tied to examinations.

Authority became tied to recognised degrees.

Research came to require particular institutional credentials.

Teachers became salaried functionaries inside bureaucratically regulated systems.

Students learned increasingly in order to satisfy an examiner they might never meet.

The question after 1947 should therefore have been larger than: What should an Indian university teach?

It should also have been: What should an Indian university be?

Instead, independent India largely expanded the inherited university system. This was understandable. A new republic urgently required engineers, administrators, doctors, scientists, teachers and lawyers. Existing institutions provided infrastructure that could be rapidly scaled.

Institutional continuity was not necessarily intellectual surrender; often it was administrative necessity.

But temporary necessity hardened into permanent architecture.

And here lies the first major lesson of India's decolonisation problem:

An institution retained for convenience will eventually begin defining what is conceivable.

Today, serious attempts are being made to alter this trajectory. The National Education Policy 2020 explicitly calls for an education system “rooted in Indian ethos”, while the University Grants Commission has issued guidelines for integrating Indian Knowledge Systems into higher education. The IKS Division of the Ministry of Education describes its objective not merely as preserving traditional knowledge but as creating research and education ecosystems capable of generating new knowledge from Bhāratīya paradigms. 

These developments are important.

Yet they also reveal the next difficulty.

Indian Knowledge Systems can be introduced into a university without the university itself becoming epistemically Indian.

A course on Nyāya can be taught through PowerPoint presentations, assessed through a three-hour written examination, classified inside a Western disciplinary taxonomy, written almost entirely through English-language secondary scholarship, evaluated through citation metrics and taught by academics whose professional advancement depends upon publishing in journals uninterested in Nyāya as a living intellectual system.

The content has changed.

The epistemic architecture has not.

This is additive decolonisation: add Indian content to an institution whose fundamental grammar remains untouched.

It is probably the most common form of decolonisation—and one of the least transformative.

When knowledge must first become a “subject”

Colonial knowledge systems possessed an enormous classificatory appetite.

To govern India, the state needed India to become legible.

Communities had to become categories.

Land had to become survey numbers.

Customs had to become codes.

Traditions had to become religions.

Knowledge traditions had to become disciplines.

Social identities had to become census entries.

The colonial census is particularly revealing. Modern scholarship shows how enumeration attempted to fit plural and locally variable identities into comparatively stable administrative categories. This did not mean that caste, community or hierarchy had been invented from nothing by colonial officials. Rather, scholars such as Nicholas Dirks have argued that colonial administration helped transform caste into a more encompassing and systematically classified description of Indian society. 

The larger lesson extends far beyond caste.

Classification is not innocent.

The moment a civilisation accepts another civilisation's taxonomy as the universal map of knowledge, it may already have surrendered part of the intellectual argument.

Consider how easily Indian intellectual traditions are forced into modern departments.

Is Ayurveda medicine?

Is Yoga physical education, psychology, philosophy or spirituality?

Is Arthaśāstra political science, economics, strategic studies or jurisprudence?

Are the Itihāsas literature, mythology, history, ethics or political thought?

Is Vāstu architecture?

Is Nāṭya aesthetics?

Is Dharma religion, ethics or law?

Every answer reveals the problem.

Many Indian systems organised knowledge across relationships that modern disciplinary boundaries separate.

Yet instead of allowing those knowledge systems to interrogate the categories of the modern university, we frequently cut them into pieces so that they fit existing departments.

The institution does not encounter another epistemology.

It domesticates it.

Decolonisation then becomes an administrative exercise in finding the correct departmental shelf on which civilisation may be stored.

Translating vocabulary is easier than translating authority

A particularly seductive form of decolonisation is lexical.

Replace knowledge with jñāna.

Replace ethics with dharma.

Replace well-being with ānanda.

Replace teacher with guru.

Replace governance with rājadharma.

The resulting document looks transformed.

Yet Sanskrit terminology does not automatically produce an Indian intellectual framework.

A concept carries with it a network of assumptions, debates, practices, texts and modes of reasoning. Removing the word from that ecosystem and attaching it to an existing modern category may do little more than provide Indic decoration.

The danger is creating institutions that are Indian in terminology but colonial in cognition.

Decolonisation cannot therefore mean translating English categories into Sanskrit.

It must sometimes involve allowing Indian categories to reorganise the question itself.

That is considerably more difficult.

It requires scholars who can move between textual traditions and contemporary disciplines; institutions willing to tolerate methodological plurality; researchers capable of working seriously in Indian languages; and evaluative systems that do not require every intellectual contribution to imitate the conventions of an American or European department before it can be recognised as knowledge.

The UGC's own recent IKS guidelines acknowledge aspects of this difficulty. One document observes that even institutions teaching traditional fields can remain dependent upon Western epistemologies and methodologies, and argues that programmes in areas such as Nyāya and Gaṇita need to be rooted more substantially in the perspective of IKS itself. 

This is the beginning of a much deeper conversation.

The bureaucratic paradox

Education is not the only arena in which independent India inherited colonial institutional DNA.

The modern administrative state exhibits striking continuities as well.

Scholarship on India's Ministry of Home Affairs, for example, has noted that despite the dramatic transfer of political authority in 1947, important organisational structures, processes and institutional memories displayed significant continuity with the colonial administration. 

Again, continuity itself should not be caricatured.

India inherited Partition, refugee movements, territorial integration, poverty, food insecurity and enormous administrative challenges. Dismantling the entire state apparatus in 1947 would hardly have constituted responsible decolonisation.

The problem arises when structures designed to govern subjects are assumed to be equally suitable for serving citizens.

Colonial bureaucracy was fundamentally extractive and supervisory. Information travelled upward. Orders travelled downward. District administration placed extraordinary authority in relatively few officials. Distance between ruler and ruled was a feature rather than a defect.

Democracy changed the source of political sovereignty.

It did not automatically change the everyday culture of administration.

Independent India therefore presents a recurring paradox: electoral democracy operating through bureaucratic structures containing deep memories of hierarchical governance.

Changing who occupies an office does not necessarily change what the office teaches its occupant to become.

This may be India's second great institutional lesson:

Personnel can be decolonised faster than power can.

Law: changing the text and changing the relationship

The legal system provides another illuminating example.

The Indian Penal Code of 1860 survived independence for more than seventy-five years before being replaced by the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, which came into force on 1 July 2024. 

Other nineteenth-century institutional inheritances have proved similarly durable. The Police Act of 1861 continues to appear in India Code and remains relevant in jurisdictions where it has not been displaced by newer state legislation; the Ministry of Home Affairs itself continues to host both the 1861 Act and the Model Police Act proposed in 2006. 

Replacing colonial statutes is therefore meaningful.

But the larger question is whether decolonising law means replacing nineteenth-century terminology or transforming the relationship between citizen, police, court and state.

A police station may operate under a postcolonial statute while retaining a colonial psychology of public order.

A court may cite Indian jurisprudential traditions while remaining inaccessible to ordinary citizens because of language, cost and procedure.

A new legal vocabulary can coexist with old assumptions about authority.

This distinction between legal decolonisation and institutional decolonisation is vital.

The former changes rules.

The latter changes relationships.

The examination may be more powerful than the textbook

Perhaps nowhere is institutional power more underestimated than in assessment.

Governments may revise curricula.

Universities may introduce Indian texts.

Schools may celebrate heritage weeks.

Teachers may attend IKS workshops.

But students quickly discover what every educational system truly values by asking a simpler question:

What will be on the exam?

Assessment determines attention.

Credentials determine aspiration.

Recruitment determines prestige.

Funding determines research.

Promotion determines academic behaviour.

A curriculum can declare that local knowledge matters, but if career advancement depends almost entirely on English-language credentials and publications, the institutional message is clear.

A policy can praise interdisciplinary knowledge, but if universities remain organised into rigid departments and promotions are evaluated within disciplinary silos, interdisciplinarity becomes ceremonial.

A university can establish an Indian Knowledge Systems centre, but if that centre exists at the periphery while the rest of the institution continues unchanged, IKS becomes a specialised enclosure rather than a substrate for intellectual renewal.

This is why decolonisation frequently stalls.

It targets syllabi, while leaving incentives untouched.

Institutions obey incentives more reliably than declarations.

The colonial institution can even colonise its critics

There is a deeper irony.

Anti-colonial scholarship itself can become dependent upon colonial structures of validation.

One may write passionately about recovering Indian knowledge but consider the work successful only after publication in a Western-indexed journal.

One may advocate Indian-language scholarship but conduct every serious academic conference in English.

One may criticise Eurocentric categories while seeking legitimacy primarily from universities whose prestige derives from precisely those categories.

One may establish centres for civilisational study but organise their functioning through the same bureaucratic mechanisms, disciplinary silos and credential hierarchies one intends to question.

None of these contradictions can be solved by purity tests. International scholarship is indispensable. English is an extraordinarily useful global language. Modern science is not “Western property”. Peer review, evidence, transparent methods and critical scrutiny should not be abandoned because they developed within particular institutional histories.

Decolonisation is not intellectual autarky.

Nor is it a programme for reversing history.

The question is not whether something came from Europe.

The question is whether India possesses enough intellectual sovereignty to decide, consciously, what to retain, what to modify, what to reject and what to create anew.

That is a very different project.

The 101 lesson: content does not defeat architecture

India's experience can therefore be reduced to a set of recurring institutional failures.

We mistake representation for reconstruction. We assume that including Indian authors means the knowledge system has changed. We confuse terminology with epistemology. We rename institutions without redesigning their incentives. We translate texts but do not rebuild communities capable of interpreting them. We preserve manuscripts but disconnect knowledge from practice. We establish specialised centres while leaving mainstream disciplines untouched. We praise Indian languages while reserving the highest intellectual prestige for English. We invite traditional practitioners into universities but allow the university alone to decide whether those practitioners count as experts. We change curriculum while retaining examinations that reward reproduction rather than inquiry. And, perhaps most importantly, we ask colonial institutions to certify whether our attempts at decolonisation are sufficiently legitimate.

The result is a peculiar inversion.

Instead of Indian knowledge transforming the university, the university transforms Indian knowledge into something administratively recognisable to itself.

Instead of Indian categories expanding contemporary research, they are reduced to elective modules.

Instead of intellectual traditions producing new theories, methods, technologies and institutions, they become objects of heritage preservation.

Civilisation becomes content.

The institution remains sovereign.

What would institutional decolonisation actually look like?

The alternative is not to burn down universities, abolish bureaucracy or discard modern science.

It is to move from recovery to regeneration.

A genuinely decolonial university would not merely offer courses about Indian Knowledge Systems. It would allow Indian intellectual traditions to participate in defining research questions, categories, pedagogies and methodologies.

It would build serious pathways for scholarship in Indian languages—not merely translations of English scholarship into Indian languages, but original knowledge production within them.

It would recognise multiple forms of expertise: textual scholarship, scientific research, craft knowledge, oral traditions, artistic practice, community memory and lived disciplinary lineages—while subjecting all of them to appropriate standards of rigour.

It would experiment with pedagogies beyond the lecture-examination cycle.

It would reconnect knowledge with observation, apprenticeship, debate, practice and application.

It would create new disciplines where necessary rather than forcing every inherited knowledge system into nineteenth-century departmental boundaries.

Most importantly, it would ask Indian Knowledge Systems to solve contemporary problems.

The goal cannot be merely to prove that an Indian scholar discovered something centuries before Europe did.

That produces civilisational reassurance, not civilisational renewal.

The more ambitious question is:

What can Indian knowledge traditions help humanity discover next?

That is the difference between archaeology and research.

Between preservation and transmission.

Between identity and capability.

Between remembering a knowledge civilisation and becoming one again.

Encouragingly, India's emerging policy language increasingly recognises this distinction. The IKS Division now describes its goal as moving beyond merely acknowledging historical knowledge towards generating new research, innovation and contemporary applications from Bhāratīya paradigms.

The success of that project will depend upon whether institutions themselves are eventually willing to change.

Decolonisation cannot be outsourced

There is perhaps a final irony in the Indian debate.

We frequently ask institutions created to standardise knowledge to produce epistemic diversity.

We ask bureaucracies created to centralise authority to revive decentralised traditions.

We ask credential systems to recognise knowledge that historically existed outside credentials.

We ask English-dominant universities to revive Indian-language intellectual cultures.

We ask academic departments constructed around modern disciplinary boundaries to recover knowledge traditions whose architecture crossed those boundaries.

Then we are surprised when the result is superficial.

Institutions are not infinitely flexible containers.

Their structures generate outcomes.

This does not make transformation impossible. Institutions can evolve dramatically. Indeed, Indian history itself provides ample evidence of traditions absorbing, debating and transforming ideas arriving from elsewhere.

But absorption is different from submission.

A civilisation capable of intellectual confidence does not reject something merely because it is foreign.

Neither does it accept something merely because it is modern.

It interrogates.

It tests.

It adapts.

And where necessary, it builds.

That last verb may be the most important.

For too much of Indian decolonisation has concerned itself with removing colonial influence and too little with building postcolonial institutions.

What would a university designed from first principles for twenty-first-century India look like?

What would research institutions organised around Indian civilisational categories but open to global science look like?

What would a genuinely multilingual knowledge economy look like?

What would teacher education look like if teachers were understood not simply as curriculum-delivery personnel but as participants in a living intellectual tradition?

What forms of peer review, apprenticeship, scholarly debate, textual study and empirical validation might emerge if India treated its intellectual inheritance as a resource for institutional innovation rather than merely curricular representation?

These are harder questions than whether another ancient text should be placed on a reading list.

They are also considerably more consequential.

From postcolonial administration to civilisational agency

India's great decolonial failure has not been that it retained everything inherited from Britain.

That would be historically inaccurate and intellectually unfair.

Independent India transformed itself in extraordinary ways, built democratic institutions at enormous scale, expanded education, developed major scientific capacities and continuously modified its inherited structures. Colonial legacies themselves are not destiny; recent economic research, for example, shows that postcolonial policy has been capable of reducing or eliminating some long-term disadvantages associated with colonial institutions even while other effects have remained more persistent. 

The failure is subtler.

It is the tendency to imagine that sovereignty over an institution automatically produces sovereignty through that institution.

It does not.

A flag can change while a bureaucracy retains its habits.

A curriculum can change while an examination retains its logic.

A law can change while the citizen-state relationship remains hierarchical.

A syllabus can include Indian knowledge while the rules deciding what counts as knowledge remain untouched.

Political decolonisation asks:

Who rules?

Cultural decolonisation asks:

Whose story is told?

Epistemic decolonisation asks:

Who determines what counts as knowledge?

Institutional decolonisation must go one step further:

What structures allow a civilisation to continuously generate, test, transmit and renew knowledge on its own terms while remaining open to the world?

Until that question is addressed, India risks endlessly attempting to decolonise colonial institutions by feeding them Indian content.

The vocabulary will change.

The ceremonies will change.

The reading lists will change.

The institutional grammar will remain.

And grammar, eventually, determines what can be said.

The real measure of Indian decolonisation will therefore not be how much of the colonial past India manages to erase.

It will be whether India can once again acquire the confidence and capability to create institutions that future generations will inherit from us.