Wednesday, March 28, 2018

Institutional Dynamics of Governance Reform in India (1991–2016) by Amitabh Ranjan

Loss of governance reform efficacy is an identified entrenched institutional problem in systems. Reform, anywhere, is a sticky material because holders of powers and their cronies have rarely shown altruistic intentions of relaxing their profiteering grips over resources. Instead, they have done their best to retain, defend and preach status quo; howsoever ossified or inhuman in form. Under these circumstances, governance reforms surface under fiscal compulsions, public order implications and/or interventions from the judiciary. This article takes up the case of India, a country where power holding, too, has been a compulsive exercise of mediation on such matters. To examine efficacy, it goes into the institutional dynamics of textual politics in course correction and process implementation. The case is built up on the strength of evidence from economic reforms, administrative reforms, police reforms, devolution strategies and corporate governance reforms during the past 25 years. The article highlights discourse ethics and concludes with a heuristic intent.

Action was taken on the following ten major reform initiatives in India during the past 25 years: (i) Economic Reforms, 1991; (ii) 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendment Acts, 1992; (iii) Electricity Act, 2003; (iv) Malimath Committee Report on Criminal Justice, 2003; (v) Right to Information (RTI) Act, 2005; (vi) Supreme Court Directives on Police Reforms, 2006; (vii) Right to Public Service Delivery Acts; (viii) Companies Act, 2013; (ix) 14th Finance Commission Report, 2014 and (x) Constitutional Amendment on Goods and Services Tax (GST), 2016.
To what extent are the outcomes satisfactory? What support have decisionmaking and implementing institutions given to the reform proposals in terms of public interest analytics, just procedures, systems integration and change management? To what extent has sovereign will asserted on the loss of governance reform efficacy? Let us examine sequentially to understand the ethical dynamics of institutional power in a country that still has a modicum of civic and social cooperation left towards the norms of constitutional law and democracy.

There is a little doubt that economic reforms of India 1991 got triggered as a sequel to macroeconomic crisis of a type described in the budget speech of its finance minister (dated 24 July 1991):
The origins of the problem are directly traceable to large and persistent macroeconomic imbalances and low productivity of investment, in particular the poor rates of return on past investments…The increasing difference between the income and expenditure of the Government has led to a widening of the gap between the income and expenditure of the economy as a whole. This is reflected in growing current account deficits in the balance of payments.1
In precise terms, India’s foreign exchange reserves in June 1991 were barely sufficient for 2 weeks of imports, and there was an imminent threat of default on external payments. Lender of last resort, under these circumstances, was the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which had an aggressive set of neoliberal conditionality clauses under its structural adjustment and stabilisation programmes. Loans were negotiated and subsequently paid off, but the executive wing of the government in power also got a space for crafting a major policy shift towards (i) fiscal discipline, (ii) removal of interest rate distortions, (iii) transparent regulation of capital markets, (iv) deregulation of industry and trade, (v) rationalisation of exchange rates and (vi) foreign investment promotion. Ideological paradigm of the entire reform set was pro-market, and the policy thrust guided by the triple missions of liberalisation, privatisation and globalisation. India became a member of the WTO in 1995.
How did the legislature take up the whole thing? It passed the Budgets put up before it after voicing concerns on human development index, poverty, joblessness and inequalities of several kinds. Amidst all concerns was a dominant liberal faith nurtured by the improved statistics on GDP, tax collection, investment and foreign exchange reserve on the one hand, and a spurt of entrepreneurial spirits on the other hand. Welfare also trickled into the legislature, piece by piece, as statutory examples of rights-based moralities—right to education, right to information, right to public service delivery and rural employment guarantee. Simultaneously, however, cases of criminal misconduct also came up in the houses of legislature, illustrating sufficiently that the State in India cannot leave the market as free as it wants and that crony capitalism is a definite social anxiety to worry about.
Second-generation neoliberal reforms, despite intense global pressures and domestic lobbying, are awaiting legislative consideration. The year 2016 is not like 1991. India has learnt its lessons by now, and its polity, with the assertion of sovereign will and public sphere, is much more sensitive now to the cost of rushing through public policy decisions than ever. After the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 and its aftermath, the neoliberal paradigm of governance advice has lost its sheen and ideological vigour everywhere, and India has indeed noted it. Democracy, in short, is in its active phase in India and asserts efficaciously. We can see this in the now discarded Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement (Second Amendment) Bill, 2015, or in the legislative creativity shown in the passing of the Constitution (122nd Amendment) Bill on GST recently.
Institutional dynamics played a big role in the implementation of the Industrial Policy Statement announced on 24 July 1991. Industrial licensing was abolished except for a short list of sixteen industries relating to security, strategic, environmental or social concerns. Similarly, whereas earlier large firms had to seek prior governmental approval for expansion of existing project and for investment in new projects under the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices (MRTP) Act, these restrictions were also abolished. The Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act was subsequently repealed, but the country took care to prepare a better-drafted and well-studied anti-trust law (The Competition Act, 2002), targeting anticompetitive conduct or abuse of dominance. In the Interim Budget of 1991–1992, the government took a policy decision to disinvest up to 20 per cent of the equity in selected PSUs in favour of mutual funds and financial or investment institutions.
The pace of progress on neoliberal labour reform proposals in India since 1991 conveys a lot on institutional factors. Labour and labour welfare are in the Concurrent List of the Constitution of India, so any amendment to the subsisting labour welfare laws requires tougher scrutiny, greater consensus-effort and a much wider human rights discourse. Besides, there is a credible context of labour history as a dimension of rights-based human emancipation in India which holders of power in democracy can ill-afford to ignore; it is an issue of legitimacy in democracy. Amidst the concerns of historical legacy and deep-rooted public perception, the neoliberal card of ‘market distortion’ has not so far worked in India despite heavy campaigning. In the year 2014, a state government (Rajasthan) succeeded in amending a few provisions of three labour laws under the argument of business promotion, but it was an extremely cautious small step. By and large, prudence on such issues has prevailed under the counterweight of Indian democracy and its discourse ethic.

The 73rd and 74th Amendments to the Constitution of India, which aimed at a fundamental shift in the nature of local governance, were passed in 1992 and came into effect in 1993 amidst high expectations. Expectations were high because India had succeeded in giving a constitutional status to its local governments—with well-drafted enabling provisions on structures, functions, empowerments and accountabilities in the amendments themselves. So, the first step had been taken with vision and care. How effective have been the subsequent steps?
We can get authentic answers from five sources: (i) 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th and 14th Finance Commission Reports, (ii) Sixth Report of the 2nd Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC) 2007, (iii) Reports of the State Finance Commissions, (iv) Local Audit Reports and (v) Devolution Index Reports. If we take the last first, we find the intent of the state governments to delegate functions, finances and functionaries to the institutions of local self-government. In the first Devolution Index prepared in India in 2009–2010 (with seventeen indicators of Devolution floor State Governments to Panchayats), Karnataka came first and Jharkhand last. Results of the Devolution Index are prepared every year, and we get an indication of intent gaps in system-building efforts. Audit Reports and Reports of the State Finance Commissions, on the other hand, highlight performance gaps and level of helplessness at the receiving end. From the angle of evaluation, Fourteenth Finance Commission Report (2014) is most eloquent:
In their interaction with this Commission, the representatives of panchayats and municipalities in an overwhelming majority of states mentioned that they faced a paucity of funds for carrying out their own mandated functions…In almost all States these local body representatives sought funds for the improvement of basic services—water supply, sanitation, sewerage, storm water drainage, solid waste management, roads and street lighting, parks and playgrounds, burial and cremation grounds. Shortage of staff was another issue highlighted by them in a majority of the States…In some States, the panchayat representatives expressed the need for further empowerment of panchayats to enable them to function as institutions of local self-government. A number panchayat representatives sought support specifically for training and capacity building of their staff, for construction of training centres, for IT infrastructure, internet connectivity, buildings for panchayats as well as their repair and maintenance, salary for the staff and honorarium for elected members…We held discussions on the working of the SFCs with Chairpersons and Member Secretaries of the sitting SFCs or the last SFCs that had submitted reports to the States. It emerged that States had constituted SFCs at different times and with varying regularity. As a result, the latest SFC constituted across States (barring one State) ranged from the second SFC to the fifth SFC…It was noticed that some instances the State Governments rejected SFC reports without recording reasons. In some States, even when the recommendations were accepted, the timeframe for implementation was not specified in the Action Taken Report presented to the legis lature. Some Chairpersons highlighted the fact that the financial recommendations get acted upon while those dealing with systematic improvements are seldom addressed. They pointed out that lack of coordination between the finance department and those dealing with rural and urban affairs hinders the implementation of measures for augmentation of resources suggested by the SFC…The Chairpersons submitted that promotion of accountability and transparency is important and social audits and public disclosure need to be encouraged.2
The 14th Finance Commission gave 28 recommendations for improving the state of affairs in local governance in India—containing postulates of performance-linked grant release, transparent disclosure, periodic self-reporting and value for money. The Report is a sharp ray of hope, more so in an improved atmosphere of competitive investment ethic these days and availability of greater fiscal transfer committed for local governance for the years 2015–2020. However, much will depend on the location-specific institutional dynamics of internal resource raising and public management of capabilities.
There are, besides these details of implementation management, certain important principles of public policy to which the second Administrative Reform Commission of India has drawn our attention: (i) principle of subsidiarity, (ii) electoral reforms, (iii) a two-way flow of information sharing in cooperative federalism, (iv) a paradigm shift in decentralised planning, (v) a separate standing committee of the state legislature for local bodies, (vi) a local body Ombudsman, (vii) citizens’ report cards, (viii) standard setting in audit and accounts, (ix) zero-based approach to staffing, (x) activity mapping, (xi) access to credit for infrastructure, (xii) strengthening of programme committees, (xiii) service delivery policy, (xiv) property tax reforms, (xv) leveraging land as a resource, (xvi) common property resources, (xvii) risk proofing in contracts and (xviii) environmental consciousness. There is no dearth of ideas; problem is only of intent.

Electricity Acts are important because of the dimensions they touch in our lives. In the literature of reforms, they assume significance due to a variety of reasons: techno-financial, operational, social, regulatory and strategic. India’s Electricity Act of 2003 should, therefore, be deconstructed in this light. In India’s economic history, this Act is a culmination of the power sector reforms that started in early 1990s.
Constitution of India empowers both the central and the state governments to legislate in the electricity sector, with distribution being the exclusive domain of the states. Indian Electricity Act, 1910, provided the original framework for the electricity supply, while Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, laid the foundation of policy and institutional framework that remained in force until the post-1991 reforms began. Electricity Laws (Amendment) Act, 1998, recognised transmission as a separate activity for the first time in India. In 1998, Electricity Regulatory Commission Act was passed, creating a Central Electricity Regulatory Commission and allowing states to create their own. Electricity Act, 2003, reflected on the legislations in existence and set into motion fundamental changes in policies. There is a proposal, through a 2015-Bill, to amend the 2003 Act. What has been the institutional experience of these moves?
The first point to note about India’s Electricity Act, 2003, and its Amending 2014 Bill is the ethic of discourse. The outcome is a seamless flow of transparent discussions on draft law with sector experts, power producers, consumer activists, utilities, state governments, Union territory administrations, financial institutions, Parliamentary Standing Committee and Parliament. Parliamentary Standing Committee made the consultation wider by inviting comments through public notice and taking them on record. Discourse process took time, but the results were enriching, particularly in the context of the worrisome past experience of opacity on Enron Contracts in Maharashtra and World Bank Power Reform Negotiations in Odisha. Attitude now was to sincerely learn and correct an ailing sector through introspection and consolidation.
Institutional vision of the 2003 Electricity Act has a combined unbundling, open access and competition thrust. As an Act of Legislature, this was a foundational change: (i) power generation was delicensed; (ii) captive generation policy was liberalised; (iii) state governments were allowed to un-bundle State Electricity Boards and create separate functionally accountable companies for generation, transmission and distribution; (iv) power trading got recognised as an activity; (v) generating stations got access to the transmission system at a fee; (vi) distribution licensees got freedom to undertake generation, and generation companies to undertake distribution licence; (vii) open access also facilitated consumers to enter into direct commercial relationship with a generating company or a trader; (viii) tariff was to be fixed premised on commercial viability principles; (ix) increased policy role was assigned to the Union government; and (x) regulatory framework in the electricity was mandatorily widened across the country.
An important implication of the 2003 Electricity Act was on cross-subsidisation: consumers under difficult circumstances could now be subsidised by the governments through their budgetary resources but not at the cost at utility’s viability. Viability of the utilities was introduced as a strict prudential norm. Another important implication was on transmission and distribution (T&D) losses. Beyond the limits of techno-spatial permissibility, T&D loss was conceptualised as theft of power and stringent measures were prescribed in 2003 Electricity Act through a detection–prosecution mechanism. Commitment to critical national policy-planning frameworks and sector-specific operative norms were other major dimensions. India’s Electricity Act, 2003, mandated formulation of (i) National Electricity Policy and tariff policy, in consultation with the state governments and authority for development of the power system, based on optimal utilisation of resources; (ii) National Policy on standalone systems for rural areas and non-conventional energy systems; (iii) National Policy on electrification and local distribution in rural areas and (iv) joint responsibility of state government and central government in rural electrification.
Evolution of India’s Electricity Act since 2003 shows a concern for evidence-based policymaking and consolidation in a gradually maturing democracy. The Amendment Bill of 2014 illustrates this point in clear terms when it takes up issues relating to (i) segregation of carriage and contents, (ii) grid security, (iii) promotion of renewable energy, (iv) rationalisation of tariff determination, (v) strengthening of regulatory commission, (vi) recovery of revenue by licensee, (vii) timely filing of tariff petitions, (viii) timely disposal of tariff petitions by appropriate commissions, (ix) initiation of suo motu proceedings by the commission for determination of tariffs, (x) accountability and transparency in the functioning of commissions, (xi) toning up of Central Electricity Authority, (xii) granting deemed licensee status to companies and (xiii) provision of performance review committees at centre and state levels for the regulatory commissions.

On 26 March 2003, the Committee on Reforms of Criminal Justice (Malimath Committee) completed its report and submitted it to the Government of India with 158 recommendations on twenty-three administrative and legislative themes. Response of the Government came out in the year 2005, when the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) (Amendment) Act, 2005, was notified, covering a select few and leaving the contested terrain intact. Later, while replying an unstarred Parliament Question on 11 December 2015 in the Rajya Sabha on further action taken, the Union government mentioned that it is in the process of consultation with the state governments on concurrent matters and examining the rest carefully: ‘criminal law’ and ‘criminal procedure’ are in the Concurrent List of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India and criminal justice reform a site of struggle for institutional power. However, there indeed are clear jurisprudential principles and established practices in the world for reference in such situations. So, there is no justification for inordinate delay on rule of law matters.
We can see the behavioural traits properly when we go into the textual politics of criminal justice reform in this case on the following two important issues.
Autonomy of Public Prosecution
Highlighting figures of low conviction rates in India, Malimath Committee (2003) recommended that each state in India should have a post of Director of Prosecution, filled up from among suitable police officers of the rank of Director General of Police (DGP) in consultation with the Advocate General of the state. The Assistant Public Prosecutors (other than the State Public Prosecutor in the High Court) should be subject to the administrative and disciplinary control of the Director of Prosecution. The Director should function under the guidance of the Advocate General and facilitate effective coordination between the investigating and prosecuting officers through a review procedure. Widespread public criticism surfaced against this type of arrangement. Criticism was on three counts: (i) disregarding established autonomy principles of ‘independent prosecution’ and ‘independent investigation’; (ii) ignoring the reality of power and influence on pre-trail criminal justice procedures and need, therefore, for institutional checks and balances; and (iii) an erroneous understanding that conviction rates would show transformative improvement with such institutionally hybrid coordination mix-ups and not degenerate into a solitary unethical pressure point.
In 2005, Government of India came up with Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act. It was an autonomy-conscious cohesive version on public prosecution, manifesting in the insertion of Section 25-A in the CrPC text and an Explanation portion after Section 24(6). Section 25-A states that the state government may establish a State Directorate of Prosecution consisting of a Director of Prosecution and as many Deputy Directors as it thinks fit, while Section 24(6) Explanation talks of a regular cadre of prosecuting officers. Section 25-A stipulates Director or Deputy Director of Prosecution to be from among advocates with at least 10 years practice, appointed with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of the High Court. Autonomy of the Directorate of Prosecution has been ensured through a well-integrated internal chain of command [vide sub-sections (4), (5) & (6) of Section 25-A]. Director of Prosecution is the Head of the Directorate and functions under the administrative control of the head of the Home Department in the state [Section 25-A(3)]. Section 25-A rightly leaves stipulation of powers of functions at the state level, but structures overall institutional reform principally and prudently.
However, problems have been caused on account of state-level amendments to the CrPC 1973. We can refer to a few. Section 25-A which has a Karnataka Amendment [Act 39 of 2012] chain of command has an Advocate General Segment in the public prosecution set up. Section 25(2) has Odisha [Act 6 of 1995] and Uttar Pradesh (UP) [Act 16 of 1976] Amendments according to which nothing is permitted to prohibit the state government from exercising its control over Assistant Public Prosecutor through police officers. Section 24(4) CrPC mandates the District Magistrate to consult the Sessions Judge in the process of preparing panel of names to be appointed as Public Prosecutors or Additional Public Prosecutors for the district. Its Maharashtra Amendment [Act 34 of 1981] omits the words ‘in consultation with the Sessions Judge’ and substitutes ‘with the approval of the State Government’.3
The Right to Silence
After examining all arguments and issues, the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice (UK: 1993) concluded that the right to silence should be retained, as abolition would benefit the police in few cases, and would put pressure on innocent people instead of experienced criminals. Despite this, the then government in the UK enacted the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, 1994, which substantially changed the right to silence of an accused person and allowed judges and jurors to draw adverse inferences when a suspect remains silent (Sections 34–39). In India, Malimath Committee Report was of the view ‘that without subjecting the accused to any duress, the court should have the freedom to question the accused to elicit the relevant information and if he refuses to answer, to draw adverse inference against the accused’ (2003, p. 267 of Volume I).4Malimath Committee Report recommend amendments to Section 313 of the CrPC 1973. It is relevant to mention here that only a year before, Law Commission of India had concluded the following:
The law in India appears to be the same as in U.S.A. and Canada. In view of the provisions of clause (3) of Article 20 and the requirement of a fair procedure under Article 21, and the provisions of ICCPR to which India is a party and taking into account the problem faced by the Courts in U.K., we are firmly of the view that it will not only be impractical to introduce the changes which have been made in U.K. but any such changes will be contrary to the constitutional protections referred to above…We have reviewed the law in other countries as well as in India for the purpose of examining whether any amendments are necessary in the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973. On a review, we find that no changes in the law relating to silence of the accused are necessary and if made, they will be ultra vires of Article 20(3) and Article 21 of the Constitution of India. We recommend accordingly. (2002, pp. 46–47 of 180th Report)5
Section 313 of the CrPC 1973 has not been amended, and this way the state and public opinion in India have sidelined Malimath Committee on this count. Balancing of interests between the rights of the detainees and the interests of national security is an essential characteristic of a fair trial: critics have rightly argued that Malimath Committee concentrated more on strengthening the hands of the administrative machinery than on the core rights-based moralities of a just order. It chose to excessively concentrate on examples of a few countries in their weak phase of human rights history and ignored established global criminal justice safeguards in the process. Empirical evidence from the UK, too, does not suggest any difference in terms conviction rate. Eminent criminologists Andrew Sanders and Richard Young (2012) have the following observations from UK on the curtailment of right to silence under the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994:
Interestingly, these changes made little difference to admission and conviction rates. While they may have greater symbolic electoral value than instrumental use, they support the broader purposes of interrogation, such as gaining general criminal intelligence and exercising disciplinary power over suspects. The conviction rate may not have increased, but the erosion of the privacy and freedom of the citizen certainly has. (Sanders & Young, 2012)
The fifth report of the Second Administrative Reform Commission (India: July 2007) took right to silence discourse further. It concluded, in a mindset of moderation, the following:
Regarding grave offences like terrorism and organised crimes, in the case of refusal by the accused to answer any question put to him, the court may draw an inference from such behaviour. This may be specifically provided in the law. (House of Commons, 2008)
More important legally is the reference of this report in the Objects and Reasons Statement of the 2008 Amendment of India’s Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. The debate on right to silence in India, thus, has not ended; it has only shrunken into a focused zone for human rights introspection.

India’s RTI Act, 2005, has a substantial in-built institutional strength, evidenced in the detection of a large number of corruption cases through it and an incessant flow of jurisprudence from its tribunals. However, there are concerns as well—the most important being its late emergence as a piece of legislation after prolonged rights-based transparency-seeking public pressure. It was certainly not a ‘gift’ from the gracious government or an ‘enthusiastic’ response of the international human rights norm-setting. Its strong draft came from the field-level action groups which in turn drew sustenance from Supreme Court judgments (since 1973) on rights of the citizens to information. Strength of India’s RTI, 2005, thus, came from ethic of discourse in public sphere within a well-understood constitutional space.
Information rights have a history of 250 years—world’s first freedom of information Act was issued in Stockholm on 2 December 1766. There have been similar other attempts since then, counter-hegemonic in thrust but not necessarily linear in progress. Hegemonic pressure was from the holders of governance power, which cherished the culture of opacity, and saw secrecy a prime bureaucratic virtue. To understand these developments, we can refer to the studies by David Vincent (The Culture of Secrecy [1998]) and D.P. Moynihan (Secrecy: The American Experience [1998]) on the roots and growth of bureaucratic secrecy. Tracing key events in their national experiences, the two authors have outlined the mechanisms devised to protect and perpetuate state secrets of the UK and the USA. While both acknowledge legitimate purposes for secrecy to some extent, they are equally convinced that withholding information from the public has often represented an abuse of power inimical to the democratic state. More important, both believe that we are at a unique moment to apply correctives to obsessive secrecy and build a relationship of tolerance and transparency.
Democratic benefits of transparency prominently figure in Kantian moral philosophy (Eternal Peace [1795]), in the writings of John Rawls (A Theory of Justice [1971] and Political Liberalism[1993]) and in the theory of discourse ethic by Jurgen Habermas (The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere [1962] and Between Facts and Norms [1992]). For Rawls, openness is a necessary condition for the creation of a just society because it (i) enables individuals to grant their informed consent to be governed and (ii) allows them to choose, rationally and knowledgeably, the principle for society with which they would agree to associate, while Habermas reflects on the universal and obligatory nature of morality by evoking the universal obligations of communicative rationality. Transparency proponents also advance instrumental reasons for imposing disclosure requirements on governments. Anticipating criticism that governments need to keep a tight rein on certain sources of information for reasons of social and economic stability, Joseph Stiglitz argues (On Liberty, the Right to Know and Public Discourse[1999]) that citizens, who own government information, must have access to it. Transparency, scholars have pointed out, not only allocate resources fairly but also ensure that benefits of growth are not captured by the elite.
I have highlighted the intrinsic worth of transparency because no interest can have the status of a ‘right’ unless it has an intrinsic worth high enough in priority to alleviate the life world. Information Rights are ‘instruments of action’ for transparent governance. They are a tactical subset of human rights, that is, procedural means to realise human emancipation. Their instrumental efficacy, however, is structurally dependent: it is dependent on the spurts of democratic consciousness coming face to face with the inertia of established power and gaining the momentum to succeed. Seen, thus, India’s RTI 2005 is a counter-hegemonic success of its people. Even in the comparative law perspective, it has seven radical features. Under this Act, a citizen is not required to establish his locus standi in respect of a subject matter for seeking information. The Act is comprehensive in the definition of ‘information’ and is applicable to government at all levels, Union, state and local, as well as recipients of government grants. Organisations concerned with national security or intelligence are not exempt from the purview of the Act if information relates to corruption or human rights violations. The Act provides for stringent punishment for denial of information. It bars all courts from entertaining any suit, application or other proceeding in respect of any order made under the Act till the exhaustion of stipulated appeal process. It also bars any suit or prosecution or other legal proceeding against any person for anything which is in good faith done or intended to be done under the Act or Rules. Section 22 of the RTI Act of India, 2005, overrides the Officials Secrets Act 1923 or any other law for the time being in force insofar as they are inconsistent with the RTI 2005.
Second Administrative Reforms Commission of India examined official secrets and confidentiality issues in its First Report (June 2006) and concluded that Official Secrets Act, 1923, should be abolished and substituted by a Chapter in a separate national security law with fresh provisions on official secrets. A reform draft on Section 5 of the 1923 Act, based on observations of the Law Commission (43rd Report: 1971) and recommended by H.D. Shourie Working Group Report of 1997, was also recommended. Another important recommendation was to amend Departmental Security Instructions with a principle that ‘ordinarily, only such information should be given a security classification which would qualify for exemption for disclosure under the Right to Information Act, 2005’. Both these are reasonable action points for good and humane governance, particularly when we find that the Official Secrets Act of UK (on which the Indian legislative version of 1923 was based) has seen a series of transformative mutations from the transparency premise. One has to only go through the authoritative writings of Patrick Birkinshaw (Freedom of Information: The Law, the Practice and the Ideal [London, 2001]) and H.W.R. Wade (Administrative Law [Oxford, 2009]) to understand the scope of transparency reforms on public order issues. There is an argument that UK Amendments have left a lot of transparency reform issues unresolved. There is merit in the argument, but in terms of discourse method, there are definite learning lessons for India: a White Paper is needed in India on Information Rights in security and stability matters in the mode of deconstruction. Security and integrity of India are absolutely non-negotiable and operational flexibilities are indeed necessary in situations of risk and unpredictability. Even then, there is enough in the zone of opacity that awaits an insightful public interest scrutiny for framing a modern substitute substantive law.
Definition of ‘information’ in the Act is genuinely comprehensive and ambit of the public authorities under the Act is also fairly wide. Effective RTI implementation of a country of India’s size, thus, involves handling access of vast, varied and complex data within a legally stipulated timeframe. It also is a sensitive legal responsibility of tackling frozen mindsets through precise knowledge, risk management skill sets and e-governance infrastructure. Continued support of combined governmental power is, therefore, needed to protect and nourish management of transformational change in state–society relationship in our country after a really long time.

In an important public interest case on police reforms, Supreme Court of India gave seven important directives to the Union government and states. The judgment was delivered on 22 September 2006 (Prakash Singh v. Union of India, https://indiankanoon.org):
  1. Constitute a State Security Commission to (i) ensure that the state government does not exercise unwarranted influence or pressure on the police, (ii) lay down broad guidelines and (iii) evaluate the performance of the state police;
  2. Ensure that the DGP is appointed through merit-based transparent process and secure a minimum tenure of 2 years;
  3. Ensure that other police officers on operational duties (including Superintendents of Police in charge of a district and Station House Officers in charge of a police station) are also provided a minimum tenure of 2 years;
  4. Separate the investigation and law and order functions of the police;
  5. Set up a Police Establishment to decide transfers, postings, promotions and other service-related matters of police officers of and below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police and make recommendations on postings and transfers above the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police;
  6. Set up a Police Complaints Authority at state level to enquire into public complaints against police officers of and above the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police in cases of serious misconduct, including custodial death, grievous hurt or rape in police custody and at district levels to inquire into public complaints against the police personnel below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police in cases of serious misconduct; and
  7. Set up a National Security Commission at the Union level to prepare a panel for selection and placement of Chiefs of the Central Police Organisations with a minimum tenure of 2 years.
Supreme Court’s Directives of 22 September 2006 were well-studied, precise and reasoned interventions. They aimed at reforming policing system in India, structurally and objectively. It was a set of insightful interventions on the functional autonomy of an accountable entity on the one hand and a transparently structured performance review system on the other hand. They very ably crafted a judicious system on complaints and rightly prioritised the need to separate investigation and law and order wings in policing.
Ideally, such reform initiatives should have come from the executive and legislative wings of the governments. Since nothing significant was happening on this count, Supreme Court had to intervene till the other wings of the government did their duty to initiate and pass reform laws on these issues. The Supreme Court of India did whatever it could do to reform the system and continued monitoring its directives till governments took legislative action. The process went on from 2006 to 2014. The Affidavits filed by the Union and state governments in this compliance-monitoring process revealed their intents fairly well and, for future researchers, left interesting material to deconstruct on institutional power dynamics in India. Police Acts too (new or amended after 22 September 2006) reveal a similar obstructive mindset on reforms.
What has been the human experience of policing since 1991? Instead of answering for or against impulsively, we can attempt a strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT) analysis of police power in terms of its structure and functions:
  1. Growth of capacity building and professionalism are, unmistakably, the two pillars of strength. Human societies have created crimes and deviance of all kinds. These are getting increasingly complicated and structured. In face of such challenges, police forces all over the world have to equip themselves technologically and managerially. Besides, there are examples of total dedication and sacrifice in police at all levels.
  2. Weaknesses are both structural and functional. History has seen the rise and fall of police states, exemplifying the degree to which police actions turn regime dependent. Even in democracies, regime dependence is often a day-to-day functional limitation for the well-meaning police persons. To the ill-meaning ones, there are well-crafted escape routes and creatures in between. The phenomenon of torture subsists, like a black shadow, in democracies. So do a few colonial legacies in postcolonial police administrations.
  3. Under these circumstances, predominant theoretical consensus is to use police reform as a constituent factor of state building by reordering state–society relations. Such a consensus sees police as not merely a powerful arm of the state but also a reservoir of locally available power and knowledge for persons in need of legal protection. The consensus is on the premise that peace and security emerge when organs of the state act in concert, operations have a sense of proportion and universal rationality adheres deepest into the system. Here, police power is perceived as an opportunity for social protection.
  4. While the emancipatory potential of police reform is narrated as a Kantian agenda of Enlightenment, its prospects often get entangled in asymmetrical power dynamics in democracies. Not averse to inviting precise police reform ideas, holders of power in government do their utmost to sabotage than to implement them. Motives are not difficult to discern: they do not want to lose their grip over an instrument of wide power in society. Resultantly, reforms wait endlessly till pathos emerges and threatens the status quo with political ramifications.
On 31 October 2006, Government of India circulated a draft Model Police Act to states for consideration and appropriate action. Idea was to improve (i) functional autonomy, (ii) professionalism, (iii) service conditions and (iv) accountability. Since then, a number of states have enacted/amended their police acts— Bihar (30 March 2007), Tripura (7 April 2007), Gujarat (27 July 2007), Assam (30 August 2007), Himachal Pradesh (21 September 2007), Chhattisgarh (28 September 2007), Rajasthan (30 October 2007), Uttarakhand (2 January 2008), Punjab (24 January 2008), Haryana (28 May 2008), Sikkim (28 June 2008), Kerala (29 January 2011), Meghalaya (4 February 2011), Mizoram (19 December 2011), Karnataka (2 June 2012 and 18 June 2013), Tamil Nadu (10 September 2013) and Maharashtra (25 June 2014 and 6 April 2015)—but the ethos with which police reforms were pronounced by the Supreme Court on 22 September 2006 was sadly missing in these and an excellent opportunity to reform was suboptimally utilised even in Tripura, Kerala, Karnataka and Maharashtra where legislative outcomes were better than others. At other places, the opportunity was simply lost due to the ruling-power sabotage.

Public service delivery is a known premise of welfare economics, but it also has a New Public Management Version which is conservative and basically treats citizens as consumers of public goods and services. The latter version emerged in the UK in 1991, in the form of Citizen’s Charter, during the election campaign of John Major of the Conservative Party. In 1997, UK’s Labour Party in government under Tony Blair reformed it with its own public philosophy variant –‘Service First: The New Charter Programme’. In the year 2008 (mid-July) came an excellent report from the Public Administration Select Committee of the House of Commons, entitled ‘From Citizen’s Charter to Public Service Guarantees: Entitlements to Public Services’. It was a performance review of the Citizen’s Charter and Charter Mark Standardisation programmes in UK, recommending an entitlement approach to public services:
In this Report, we consider the lasting legacy of the Citizen’s Charter programme—in particular, its core idea of empowering public service users by defining their entitlements to public services. We look at three aspects of that initiative in particular. First, we re-examine the underlying principles of the Citizen’s Charter and assess their continuing relevance to public service delivery (Chapter 2). We then explore the part of the Citizen’s Charter programme concerned with improving services to the users, the Charter Mark, and its recent successor, the Customer Service Excellence standard (Chapter 3). Finally, we consider the issues raised by setting entitlements to minimum standards of public services, and propose that a set of ‘Public Service Guarantees’ be created to allow people to claim their rights to agreed standards of public service provision (Chapter 4). (House of Commons, 2008)
In India, the Second Administrative Reform Commission prepared its 12th Report (Citizen Centric Administration: The Heart of Governance [February 2009]) and had a twenty-five page chapter on Citizens’ Charter. It took note of the developments in the UK since 1991, reviewed Indian initiatives (Public Service Delivery Excellence Model Sevottam and IS 15700:2005 of the Bureau of Indian Standards) and recommended a Mandatory Seven-Step Model for Citizen-Centricity for all organisations having public interface in the Union and state governments. The Seven-Step Model of Citizen-Centricity (2nd ARC: 2009) gave autonomy to each office to (i) define all services it provides to its clients, (ii) set standards and norms for each service, (iii) develop capability to meet the set standards, (iv) perform to achieve the standards, (v) monitor performance against the set standards, (vi) evaluate the impact through an independent mechanism and (vii) undertake continuous improvement based on monitoring and evaluation results. On 8 December 2009, union government accepted the recommendation and also the recommendation that Citizens’ Charters should be made effective by (i) internal restructuring, (ii) process reforms, (iii) benchmarked end-user feedback, (iv) civil society consultation, (v) office accountability framework and (viii) rectification mechanism—all tending towards a fuller concept of citizens as accountability-seeking sovereigns rather than mere consumers of public goods and services.
Indian states have gone beyond non-justiciable Citizens’ Charters. This has happened since 2010, with Madhya Pradesh enacting the first public services delivery guarantee Act in August 2010 and other following it (Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Delhi, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir, Jharkhand, Karnataka, Punjab, Rajasthan, Uttarakhand and UP in 2011; Assam, Kerala and Odisha in 2012; Goa, Gujarat and West Bengal in 2013; Haryana in 2014; and Maharashtra in 2015). In between, in 2011, Union Government introduced a forty-seven-page Bill (called, The Right of Citizens for Time-Bound Delivery of Goods and Services and Redressal of Grievances Bill 2011: Bill No. 131) in Lok Sabha, but the Bill lapsed due to the dissolution of the 15th Lok Sabha in May 2014. This was despite the fact that the Department-Related Parliamentary Standing Committee had given its report in August 2012. How important was the text of the Union government’s 2011 Bill from people’s point of view? We can begin with the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Bill, as stated by the Government of India in December 2011, and then go on to the debate on it recorded in the Parliamentary Standing Committee Report of August 2012:
Citizens’ Charters were introduced in India in 1997, which was voluntary in character. The main elements of the Citizens’ Charter were to be published containing the details of services and the time period for delivery of such services. These Charters gradually spread from Central Ministries and Departments to States and their Organisations. However, majority of them remained ineffective and dormant. In order to improve Public Service Delivery, a service excellence model called ‘Sevottam’ was initiated in 2005 to give a new thrust to the implementation of Citizens’ Charter, which has been successfully piloted in a few chosen organisations of the Government of India and those of States and is being upscaled considerably. Centralised Public Grievance Redress and Monitoring System (CPGRAMS) was launched in 2007, which is a web-based portal for lodging complaints by the public. It is now operational in all the Ministries and Departments of the Government of India along with about 6000 of their subordinate organisations. Many States have also enacted Right to Public Service Delivery Legislation in which a few important public services have been selected for service delivery. It was felt that these efforts were noteworthy, but in the absence of an overarching structure, their impact was diluted and limited. In this context, it was felt that Rights-based approach be followed in this respect by making the Citizens’ Charter statutory and endowing public with the right to get delivery of services within stipulated timelines. (Rajya Sabha, 2012)
In February 2012, the Parliamentary Committee openly invited comments on the Bill from individuals and organisations. Forty-seven issues were raised in response. When the Committee sought the comments of the government, it agreed with four of them—that is, to (i) enlarge the scope of the Bill from individuals to organisations as well, (ii) synergise the Bill with the RTI Act, (iii) integrate the Bill with the Electronic Delivery of Services Bill, and (iv) a reward system for outstanding service delivery. The Parliamentary Committee endorsed the provisions of the Bill to incorporate all categories of goods supplied and services rendered, keeping the fact in view that the Public Authority has powers to normatively determine the time frame of service delivery. The Committee also endorsed the comprehensive definition of the word ‘complaint’ in the Bill to include issues relating to law, policy, scheme and administrative order. The Committee noted the provision in the Bill for Grievance Redress Officer to report to the Designated Authority, after the expiry of 30 days, every complaint that has not been redressed (along with relevant details) and it shall be treated as an appeal with the Designated Authority and added that this should be under intimation to the complainant. The Committee also noted that the Bill takes cognisance of the increasing participation of the private sector in providing goods and services to the people on contract and, through a notification process and reasonable classification, brings them into the ambit of the term ‘public authority’.
An important meta-policy view was put before the Parliamentary Committee on the desirability of having an ‘overarching’ country-wide central legislation on public service delivery (essentially a location-specific set of issues) when the states have already moved ahead and enacted laws. The Committee noted existence of such laws in twelve states but came to the following conclusion:
The Committee takes note of the fact that the Bill has been enacted by the Central Government in pursuance to Entry 8 of List III of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India which enumerates the subject matters falling under the Concurrent List. The said Entry 8 mentions ‘actionable wrongs’. The Committee further takes note of the provisions of Article 246 of the Constitution which deals with subject matters on which laws can be made by the Parliament and the legislatures of the States. As per Article 246(2), both the Parliament and the State Legislatures have the powers to legislate on matters enumerated in List III. The Committee also takes note of the fact that the layout and the scheme of the Bill ensure that the Public Authorities under the Central and the State Governments, while implementing the Bill are independent of each other. The Committee feels that both the Central Government and the State Governments would be in a position to implement the Bill independently and without each other’s interference. Central legislation on subjects mentioned in the Concurrent List, has always triggered the activities of the State Governments in that regard and, have always been seen as bringing in greater awareness in the States about the subjects in question. (ibid., pp. 61–62)
There was no response from the Government of India on the issues raised in the 53rd Report of the Department-Related Standing Committee of Parliament (Rajya Sabha, 2012) on ‘the Right of Citizens for the Time-Bound Delivery of Goods and Services and Redressal of their Grievances Bill 2011’ till the Bill lapsed in May 2014. There is no explicit reason for this. States, on the other hand, have been comparatively more active: the figure of states with Rights-based Public Service Delivery Act in India has crossed twenty now. There still are, however, uncovered areas, and quality of the texts of the State Laws has huge gaps of intent. There is no fresh move for a central legislation either. Issues of public interest in the public service delivery mechanisms, however, remain and eagerly await empowering solutions.

The Companies Act, 2013, is a major corporate governance reform legislation of India which takes full cognisance of the phenomenon of corporate irresponsibility and frauds and understands the significance of rectificatory reform legislations of other countries. Essentially, however, it is an outcome of intense nationwide corporate governance reform discourse in India, seeking (i) transparent reporting framework, (ii) accountable audit functions, (iii) fair, participatory and decisive boards, (iv) entrenched managerial ethics, (v) adequate investor protection and (vi) wider corporate social responsibility contribution. Besides the Ministries and the Parliamentary Committees, Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) played a highly creative institutional role in providing evidence-based policy inputs till the drafting of the Bill and setting a few justified stricter corporate governance standards for ‘listed companies’ after the Bill became an Act. The whole process of discourse ethic took time, but the outcome was transformative in several ways.
Companies Act, in any country, has a wide zone of consideration. Stakeholders in companies are many; not only shareholders, financiers and management. There is an in-built stakeholding of the government and the community as well; because when companies turn fraudulent or cause fiscal crisis, entire nation suffers. These varied interests and concerns, therefore, necessitate elaborate crafting in the texts of legislations to bring in a conceptual vision of operational ethics, systemic stability and institutional justice. With a huge and complex architecture of 470 Sections and VII Schedules, Companies Act, 2013, has achieved these. From the vision of corporate governance reform, the following specific points can be highlighted from the Act 2013:
  1. Accounting and Auditing Standards [Section 2(7)].
  2. Maintenance of Books of Accounts & Other Papers in e-Mode [Section 2(12)].
  3. Statutory Recognition to Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer [Section 2(18) and 2(19)].
  4. Inclusion of Cash Flow Statement in Financial Statement [Section 2(40)].
  5. Formation of One-Person Company [Section 2(62)].
  6. Increase in Number of Members in Private Company [Section 2(68)].
  7. Fifteen Types of Companies [Section 3].
  8. Compulsion for Articles [Section 5].
  9. Global Depositary Receipt [Section 41].
  10. Prohibition on Issue of Shares at Discount [Section 53].
  11. Restriction on the Reduction of Capital [Section 66].
  12. Prohibition on Acceptance of Deposits from Public [Section 73].
  13. Increase in the Quorum Requirement [Section 103].
  14. Minutes of Meeting of Shareholders and Creditors [Section 118].
  15. Declaration of Dividend [Section 123].
  16. Mandatory Consolidated Financial Statements [Section 129].
  17. Constitution of National Financial Reporting Authority [Section 132].
  18. Corporate Social Responsibility [Section 135].
  19. Right of Members to Copies of Audited Financial Statement [Section 136].
  20. Mandatory Internal Audit [Section 138] and Audit Committee [Section 177].
  21. Appointment of Auditors, Their Powers and Duties and Auditing Standards [Sections 139 and 143].
  22. Directors, Independent Directors and Director Elected by Small Share-holders [Sections 149, 150 and 151]. Prohibition of Insider Trading of Securities [Section 195].
  23. Nomination & Remuneration Committee and Stakeholders Relationship Committee [Section 178].
  24. Establishment of Serious Fraud Investigation Office [Section 211].
  25. Prevention of Oppression and Mismanagement [Sections 241–246]. Punishment for Fraud [Section 447].
These are highlights through keywords. They indicate the reform roadmap Companies Act, 2013, lays down for companies and governments in India. It is true that the real worth of innovative excellence can only be understood in the details of the text of the Act, but it does indicate the range well enough.
Implementation of the Companies Act, 2013, too, has maintained pace. 2014 saw drafting and notification of Rules under the Act; 2015 an amendment to the Act; and March 2016 a Bill to amend the Act further. It is good that the democratic churning is going on to improve corporate governance in companies further. At least two trends are quite clear: (i) provisions on fraud detection and punishment shall continue becoming tighter; and (ii) ‘ease of doing business’ shall remain a priority in most future Amendments, with a focus on start-ups.
Companies Act, 2013, has already created a fairly specialised set of institutions for action. A lot of success will depend on the quality of their functioning. We can also expect creative policy interventions from SEBI under the powers it has to set corporate governance standards for listed companies.

Constituted on 2 January 2013 under Article 280 of the Constitution of India, the 14th Finance Commission finalised its Report on 5 December 2014 and submitted it with 121 Recommendations. The following among them are important governance reform recommendations:
  1. Books of accounts prepared by the local bodies should distinctly capture income on account of own taxes and non-taxes, assigned taxes, devolution and grants from state, grants from the Finance Commission and grants for any agency functions assigned by the union and state governments. States should take action and have them audited in time (para 9.61).
  2. We are providing performance grants to address the following issues: (i) making available reliable data on local bodies’ receipt and expenditure through audited accounts; and (ii) improvement in own revenues. In addition, the urban local bodies will have measure and publish service level benchmarks for basic services (para 9.75).
  3. To be eligible for performance grants, the gram panchayats will have to submit audited annual accounts that relate to a year not earlier than 2 years preceding the year in which the gram panchayat seeks to claim the performance grant. It will have to show an increase in the own revenues of the local body over the preceding year, as reflected in the audited accounts (para 9.76).
  4. The scheme for disbursement of the performance grant will be notified by the state governments latest by March 2016, in order to enable the preparation of the eligibility list of local bodies entitled to them. The concerned ministries of the union government will also be informed in order to facilitate release of the instalment of performance grants (para 9.77).
  5. We recommend that the state governments should strengthen State Finance Commissions. This would involve timely constitution, proper administrative support and adequate resources for smooth functioning and timely placement of State Finance Commission Report before state legislature, with action taken notes (para 9.84).
  6. We suggest that the existing rules be reviewed and amplified to facilitate the levy of property tax and the granting of exemptions be minimised (para 9.90).
  7. We suggest that the levy of vacant land tax by peri-urban panchayats be considered. In addition, a part of land conversion charges can be shared by the state governments with municipalities and panchayats (para 9.91).
  8. States should prepare a clear framework of rules for the levy of betterment tax (para 9.92).
  9. We recommend that state governments take action to assign productive local assets to the panchayats, put in place enabling rules for collection and institute systems so that they can obtain the best returns while leasing or renting common resources (para 9.98).
  10. We recommend that the urban bodies rationalise their service charges in such a way that they are able to recover the operation and maintenance costs from the beneficiaries (para-9.99).
  11. We are of the view that mining puts a burden on local environment and infrastructure, and, therefore, it is appropriate that some of the income from royalties be shared with the local body in whose jurisdiction the mining is done (para 9.101).
  12. We recommend that the union and state governments examine in depth the issue of properly compensating local bodies for the civic services provided by them to government properties and take necessary action, including suitable legislation, in this regard (para 9.102).
  13. We recommend that local bodies and states explore the issuance of municipal bonds as a source of finance with suitable support from the union government (para 9.107).6
I have chosen to highlight these thirteen Recommendations of the Fourteenth Finance Commission because (i) this Commission had a Term of Reference on ‘the measures needed to augment the Consolidated Fund of a State to supplement the resources of the Panchayats and Municipalities in the State’ and (ii) despite known solutions such as these, no political will has been shown since years to implement reforms anywhere in the country. States, ever keen as they are, to get resources at their level, are not too willing to care for the financial foundations of local governance.

On 8 September 2016, the Constitution (101st Amendment) Act, 2016, of Parliament received the assent of the President of India for introduction of GST in the country; the notification for bringing into force Article 279A(1) with effect from 12 September 2016 was issued on 10 September 2016; and, on 12 September 2016, Union cabinet approved creation of GST Council and its Secretariat.
Article 279A(1) creates GST Council and entrusts it with huge responsibilities. It is an institutional mechanism comprising a chairperson (Union finance minister) and one minister nominee from each state government as members. The Union minister of state in charge of revenue or finance is also a member. Idea seems to be to make GST Council a body of finance ministers, but discretion of the chief ministers (CMs) has been kept rather wide: ‘the Minister in charge of Finance or Taxation or any other Minister nominated by each State Government’. Nominee ministers from the state governments have been given the power to choose ‘one amongst themselves’ a Vice-Chairperson of the Council ‘for such period as they may decide’, allowing rotation, if needed.
One-half of the total number of members of the GST Council is the determined quorum at its meetings, and every decision is to be taken by a majority of not less than three-fourths of the weighted votes (central government one-third weightage of the votes cast and state governments taken together, two-thirds) members present and voting at the meeting. Other procedures in the performance of its functions have been left to the GST Council. Besides these, Article 279A(10) of the Constitution of India has the following provisions:
No act or proceedings of the Goods and Services take Council shall be invalid merely by reason of (a) any vacancy in, or any defect in, the constitution of the Council; or (b) any defect in the appointment of a person as a Member of the Council; or (c) any procedural irregularly of the Council not affecting the merits of the case.
The GST Council has been mandated to be ‘guided by the need for a harmonised structure of goods and services tax and for the development of harmonised national market for goods and services’. With these objectives in view, the Council has to recommend the following:
  1. the taxes, cesses and surcharges levied by the Union, the states and the local bodies which may be subsumed in the GST;
  2. the goods and services that may be subjected to, or exempted from GST;
  3. model GST Laws, principles of levy, appointment of GST levied on supplies in the course of inter-state trade or commerce under Article 269A and the principles that govern the place of supply;
  4. the threshold limit of turnover below which goods and services may be exempted from GST;
  5. the rates including floor rates with bands of GST;
  6. any special rate or rates for a specified period, to raise additional resources during any natural calamity or disaster;
  7. special provision with respect to the states of Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Jammu and Kashmir, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Sikkim, Tripura, Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand; and
  8. any other matter relating to the GST, as the Council may decide.
After receipt of GST Council Recommendations, legislative action is expected to be taken. The GST Council has also been empowered to recommend the date on which the GST be levied on petroleum crude, high-speed diesel, motor spirit, natural gas and aviation turbine fuel. Article 279A(11) of the Constitution of India also mandates the GST Council to establish a mechanism to adjudicate any dispute (i) the Government of India and one or more states; or (ii) between Government of India and any state or states on the one side and one or more other states on the other side; or (iii) between two or more states, arising out of the recommendations of the Council or implementation thereof.
GST will certainly be a game changing reform for the Indian economy, by creating a common Indian market and reducing the cascading effect of tax on the cost of goods and services. It will impact the tax structure, tax incidence, tax computation, tax payment, compliance, credit utilisation and reporting, leading to a complete overhauling of the current indirect tax system. It will also have a far-reaching impact on business operations—from pricing of products and services to tax compliance systems and from supply chain optimisation to e-governance and realistic accounting. More important, it will be an ethical reform to bring in transparency and simplification in operations and push up GDP significantly.
There is a vigorous move to bring in the GST as early as possible. It is a tough task—politically, and also in terms of the institutional dynamics of political support. There are a few contentious issues, administrative loose ends and drafting challenges. If it succeeds, and there is likelihood that it will, it will be only due to the fact that the GST Council has been created as a truly discursive body in the spirit of cooperative federalism: it is not merely a forum of compensation seekers but apex recommendatory constitutional entity. The voting pattern of the Council is such that the States will play a major role with a two-third share, and though the central government with a one-third share has veto power, decisions will normally be taken by a three-fourth majority. With a mature system of fair representation and genuine discourse, India’s latest move on a complex foundational issue of governance is more likely than not to succeed.


Fourteenth Finance Commission Report (2014). Retrieved from www.finmin.nic.in
House of Commons. (2008). From citizen’s character to public service guarantees, entitlements to public services (Twelfth Report of Session 2007–2008, p. 4). London, UKPublic Administration Select Committee
Rajya Sabha. (2012). The right to citizens for the time-bound delivery of goods and services and redressal of their Grievances Bill, 2011 (pp. 78). New Delhi, IndiaFifty-third Report of the Department-related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Personnel, Public Grievances, Law and Justice
Sanders, Andrew, Young, Richard (2012). From suspect to trial. In Maguire, Mike, Morgan, Rod, Reiner, Robert (Eds), The Oxford handbook of criminology (5th edn., p. 851). OxfordOxford University Press.

Keywords Neoliberalismgovernancereformsinstitutional dynamicsIndia

Article Courtesy: http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0019556116689765

Tuesday, January 30, 2018

A New Year - A New Milestone

When The 'Temple' of Indian Public Administration Research & Studies - Indian Institute Of Public Administration's (IIPA) next coveted publication gives this blog https://publicadministrationtheone.blogspot.in/ a special and exclusive mention, that is proof that this blog is on the right path. Here it is:
"A public administration study blog used by all India services aspirants for their examinations called Publicadministrationtheone.blogspot.in/. mentions that one major reason why the numerous recommendations of Committees and Commissions did not get implemented was because these were expected to be followed up in ministries and departments which implemented only those recommendations that did not threaten their positions and prevented their lateral and vertical spread. The costs of running such huge bureaucracies in the Centre and the States was never considered very seriously as there was always an organic interdependence between the bureaucrat and the politician that transcended the common weal." 
http://59.180.241.219:8080/xmlui/bitstream/handle/1/2094/UshaMunshiPublic_Administration_final_edit.PDF?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
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Apart from the above milestone, the other spectacular news is that the MHRD, under its National Mission on Education through ICT (NME-ICT), has assigned work to the UGC for development of e-content in 77 subjects at postgraduate level. The content and its quality is the key component of education system.
High quality, curriculum-based,interactive content in different subjects across all disciplines of social sciences, arts, fine arts & humanities, natural & mathematical sciences, linguistics and languages is being develope under this initiative named e-PG Pathshala.
And this blog finds a special mention here as well in the Public Administration catalogue content:
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Shodhganga : a reservoir of Indian theses is a digital repository of theses and dissertations submitted to Indian universities. It is maintained by INFLIBNET Centre which is an autonomous Inter-University Centre of the University Grants Commission (UGC) of India located in the campus of Gujarat University, Ahmedabad. As on 4 October 2016, as many as 293 universities in India have signed MoUs with the INFLIBNET Centre to participate in the Shodhganga project. The top five universities in terms of the numbers of theses submitted are Panjab University, Aligarh Muslim University, Jawaharlal Nehru University, Karnatak University and Anna University. 
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International Journal of Science Research In Science & Technology:
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International Research Fellows Association
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ScienceDirect:
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ModernGhana A Critical Analysis Of The Policies And Programmes Of The Restoration Administration:
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EUROPEAN INTEROPERABILITY REFERENCE ARCHITECTURE:
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Berlin University: Smart Cities Mission in India
Analysing the implementation mechanism and its impact on urban governance:

Friday, December 22, 2017

Governance: Civil Service & Politician Interface By B K Chaturvedi

     " It has to be emphasized that the onus is on civil servants to strengthen public administration and good governance. However, while working as part of policy making or field responsibilities, it may be useful to understand the nature of the relationship between the political executive and the civil service. It is also necessary to appreciate the enormous inconvenience and widespread corruption faced by the people while availing public service"

Two important issues facing the nation today are how the economic growth can be accelerated and how benefits of growth and development can flow to the citizens in an efficient manner. Issues of governance have increasingly come to centre stage while working out strategies for the above. There is a strong view that corruption in civil service is endemic and funds provided by government leak very badly. I recall a recent discussion during a book launch when it was argued that from the famous fifteen paisa reaching the poor man, the amount is now reduced to five paisa. There are large technological changes taking place in our society. The aspirations and expectations of citizens from the government system are of delivery of service of the highest order of excellence.

The independence of civil service in giving advice in policy-making and in performing field responsibilities is an important issue which has affected the functioning of the civil service in recent years. In the Constituent Assembly of India, on 10th October, 1949, Sardar Vallabh Bai Patel said:“If you want an efficient all-India service, I advise you to allow the service to open their mouth freely. If you are a Premier, it would be your duty to allow your Secretary, or Chief Secretary, or other services working under you, to express their opinion without fear or favour. But I see a tendency today that in several provinces, the services are set upon and told, “No, you, are servicemen, you must carry out our orders.” The Union will go, you will not have a united India, if you do not have a good all-India service which has the independence to speak out its mind, which has a sense of security that you will stand by your word and that after all, there is the Parliament, of which we can be proud, where their rights and privileges are secure. If you do not adopt this course, then do not follow the present Constitution.”

And further: “Today my Secretary can write a note opposed to my views. I have given that freedom to all my Secretaries. I have told them, “If you do not give your honest opinion for fear that it will displease your Minister, please then you had better go. I will bring another Secretary,” I will never be displeased over a frank expression of opinion."  the 1950s1 and even the early 1960s, the relationship between political executive and civil service was of trust and non-partisan functioning of the civil service. This trust has gradually given way to segmentation of civil servants and their politicisation in many cases. Two different types of relationships have emerged. First covers those, who try to maintain a degree of integrity and upright behaviour. Second covers those senior civil servants, who cosy up to the political executive and go along with them, irrespective of the civil service norms, good conduct or ethical behaviour. Often, the second category is bifurcated when the political power is transferred from one political party to the other. Invariably, one group of the committed faction of civil service starts its innings in close proximity with the political executive and the other committed class is put in the dog house. Of the first category, the number is gradually dwindling. There is increasingly a feeling that civil servants who fall in this category may not be treated fairly by the political class in respect of their assignments, transfers or their other service matters.

An important point, which is often overlooked in the above context, is the requirement of citizens for good governance. This is invariably a casualty when the political executive and the civil service cosy up to each other forgetting the norms for good administration. The Civil Service provides an exciting opportunity full of challenges. There are very few services which provide such a vast range of challenges, a mix of field and policy making opportunity and opportunity to act as a key player in the national growth process. One has to be proud of one’s work and dedication to get full satisfaction from these challenges. These, however, require qualities which one has to develop.

Senior civil servants belonging to All India Services (AIS) have a special responsibility, in case they are to live up to the commitment with which they have entered the service. Business as usual cannot deliver results. The civil service has to live up to certain norms of behaviour which, in the long run will bring them success, but may be painful in the short run. At times, acting in accordance with laws and rules or pointing out their implications may be termed as risk-aversing behaviour. One may be assigned inconsequential jobs. There can be others who may try to get short-run advantages by using their closeness to political masters. In the long-run, however, persons who have acted in accordance with norms and delivered results are generally able to come up and be recognized. Such civil servants are well-respected by peer groups, subordinates, the people and even the political parties across the spectrum.

Civil Service has to follow norms of professional conduct. These will not only bring good governance agenda on centre stage, but also once again enhance the reputation of the All India Service as that of a steel frame which serves the country for growth and prosperity. It will also help in development of confidence of people in the civil services and earn them new respect.2 Let me highlight some norms for civil servants:
First, maintain high personal integrity. The strength of civil service is people’s faith in their absolute incorruptibility and honesty. This is specially so in top civil servants who should be absolutely beyond reproach. This gives you strength to get your way with the political executive who respect such officers. Even in corrupt regimes, such officers are respected.

Second, be fair in administering law, policies and administrative decisions. The biggest strength of civil servants is people’s faith in their impartial and fair actions and transparent functioning. Do make positive efforts to ensure that your decisions appear fair and transparent in people’s eyes as well. It is worth several battalions of paramilitary forces.

Third, people respect you for your knowledge and skills. Acquire thorough knowledge and develop an analytical ability to fully assess and understand issues which need to be addressed with adequate attention to details. Decisions arrived at, after full understanding of issues, are likely to be implementable and deliver expected results.

Fourth, field jobs, on which civil service often has to spend time, provide an opportunity for change in the system. Your motto should be to deliver results and work as an effective field officer. This may require taking tough and unpopular decisions. It often requires “out of the box” thinking and taking action against the corrupt. Don’t hesitate while taking the right action. But be fair and just in your decisions. You may have to face difficult times in some cases.

Fifth, Good Governance is a Fundamental Right of the citizen. Identify gaps in public service delivery and implementation of schemes. Identify rules and regulations which are hampering progress and suggest changes to Government. Use innovation and adoption of best practices in implementation and encourage its development in your team. Be openminded and mentally receptive to new ideas. Delivery of public services, if done efficiently, leads to consumer satisfaction, optimum use of financial resources, economic betterment and lower corruption.

Sixth, the biggest disservice to the governance structure is to hesitate in taking decisions or deliberately avoiding it. Do not hesitate to take decisions. If you have reservations on your ability or are worried about being responsible for its consequence, don’t join the civil service. The entire career in civil service is about taking decisions and making clear policy recommendations for decision taking. Acts of omission often may go unnoticed or not punished. These are, however, extremely harmful for good governance.

Seventh, in civil service you may invariably be the leader of the pack. Assume full responsibility for achieving the targets and key performance parameters of the organization which you are heading. Learn to delegate authority but ensure effective leadership. This can come if you are perceived by your organization as not prone to blaming subordinates for shortcomings in any targets. This will earn respect from subordinates, colleagues and even seniors. It is an excellent remedy for success of leadership.

Eighth, be sensitive to the needs of poor, especially marginalised groups, women, SC/ST and minorities. These are the groups which need your support the most. By effective implementation of programmes for them and your empathy for their welfare, you can help build an egalitarian society. Affirmative actions in their favour build confidence in civil service.

Ninth, the political executive makes policies in consultation with civil servants for attaining certain objectives for the welfare of people. While advising Ministers and working as senior civil servants, analyse all the reasonable policy options which can be considered on the issue under examination. Examine also whether a policy, that the government is wanting to implement, is under any political compulsion and has short-term benefits only and not in the long-term national interest. If so, put forth your views clearly and logically. Suggest quite clearly, with reasons, why you consider any policy option as the most appropriate and meeting the policy objectives.

While giving advice, do not anticipate what the Minister may like to hear. State what you consider the most appropriate course of action. You will be respected in the long run by peers, as well as the political executive.

Tenth, do not criticise Government policies in public discussions. As a civil servant, the responsibility on you is to provide support to the government to enable it to defend the policies. By criticising it, you are undermining government, as well as yourself. If the issue is really serious and you do not think that you can live with such government policies, you should consider quitting the job and undertake other assignments.

Eleventh, develop inter-personal skills. In the modern world with wide range of organisations, private sector expansion and technological explosion, it is important that you have good relations with persons from different sectors to enable you to access them when needed. It increases your effectiveness while handling difficult issues in the field.

Twelfth, adapt to IT use, new technologies and their use to ensure good governance. Information technology can help reduce delays, ensure efficient delivery of public services and cut down corruption. You must be, therefore, fully cognisant of its use and potential. Simplifying administrative procedures promotes good governance.

Thirteenth, prepare well in advance to ensure effective articulation of the view point of your Ministry. Put forward your point of view concisely and in a focused manner. It is important that you absorb fully the issues at hand and are clear in your mind about the approach which you wish to take in any inter-ministerial forum.

Fourteenth, develop the ability to listen to visitors and different points of view carefully and patiently. An enormous amount of feedback about problems in the field and different approaches can be had in this manner. This is the best learning method.

Fifteenth, develop the ability to integrate and form a consensus view point consistent with the policy objective planned. While doing so, you should be able to evaluate and assess the technical, social and political dimensions of the problem. This is extremely critical at senior policy-making levels where different approaches and points of view have to be put together. You should not be shy of taking tough decisions in the interest of effective policy implementation.

Sixteenth, make a well-informed judgement of ground realities and policies which will work. Have a feedback on the proposed policies from those working in different geographical area where the proposed policies or plans are supposed to be implemented. Ensure enough flexibility with ground realities in your plans.

Seventeenth, accept challenging assignments. Do not try to wriggle out of it. Often, these assignments involve tough decision taking and have risk of failure. Success can be assured if you have accepted the challenging job and are working diligently with all stakeholders as a team. This will give you visibility and test your ability to handle tough assignments.

Eighteenth, in face of grave provocation, stand by your principles and convictions. Do not lose your cool. The administrative challenges are varied and involve wide varieties of people and organisations with vested interests. You can handle them only if you are considering all questions coolly and objectively.

Nineteenth, civil servants are accountable to Government. There is, however, public accountability also. Identify key target areas which you must achieve during your work based on Government policy and programmes. Identify people’s felt needs and enmesh them in your programme too.

An interesting aspect, in the above context, is the relative responsibility of political executive and the civil service in improving the governance system. It has to be emphasized that onus is on civil servants to strengthen public administration and good governance. However, while working as part of policy making or field responsibilities, it may be useful to understand the nature of relationship between the political executive and the civil service. It is also necessary to appreciate the enormous inconvenience and widespread corruption faced by the people while availing public service. Following points, therefore, need special focus:

First, the corruption in governance system and delivery of public services is quite widespread. It has to be tackled initially by preventing possibility of corruption. For this, it is necessary to make public service delivery procedures simple, use of Information Technology and bringing in transparency in decision taking. Next, those guilty of corruption have to be identified and punished quickly. Second, it is useful to recall that the All India Services are creatures of the constitution (Article 312).

While the services have to follow the policies laid down by the Government headed by the political executive, they also have legal obligations under certain statutes, whenever they exercise those powers. Such exercise of power has to be done with an independent application of mind. Third, it is important that Civil Servants clearly bring out their views in writing while doing an analysis of the issues concerned when engaged in the task of policy making. If certain government policy is not in public interest and may lead to harmful results, this has to be clearly brought out in your notes and analysis. Once, however, you have clearly mentioned your view and a considered decision has been taken, it has to be implemented with full vigour.

Thus, while the civil servant is free to express his views freely, one cannot keep opposing a decision taken by the government unless there are serious intellectual differences. In such cases, one should consider quitting the job and undertake new assignments. Fourth, there may be complex situations in which Ministers and some civil servants try to push illegal orders on subordinates. This could be because of ulterior monetary interest or corruption. There could be Mafia. In all this foggy and unclear vision, the civil servants have to be clear on their course of action for handling these situations. The approach should be quite clear to

 them while handling these situations. First, orders which are illegal or against any statutes or interfere with your exercise of authority vested in you under a law, have to be ignored. Second, administrative orders, if you find unfair or unjust, must be protested against with reasons. If reiterated, these have to be implemented. It may in some cases, cause damage to one’s career. In the long-run, however, peers and colleagues respect you for it. In many cases, colleagues and seniors come forward to undo the damage to your career caused by your not implementing unfair or unjust orders. Success has its price. It cannot be built on falsehoods, inequity and illegality.

The political executive which is responsible to the legislature has to also reconsider how the governance can be strengthened. The norms of conduct mentioned above will need a strong political consensus. They may need to discuss it across the country and their readiness to act on it as Sardar Patel had advised more than six decades back.

Author: B.K. Chaturvedi
Article Courtesy: http://yojana.gov.in/2014/eng/Yojana%20March%202014.pdf

Thursday, September 14, 2017

The perennial generalist vs specialist debate - TSR Subramanian

Half-baked impractical ideas such as lateral entry should not be encouraged. The room for abuse is enormous


The specialist vs. generalist debate in India’s civil services resurfaces periodically. One has seen a chief of the electricity board, an excellent engineer who managed his power plants and transmission systems extremely well, totally clueless in matters relating to power policy. One has also seen a first-rate irrigation chief engineer taking over as secretary of the irrigation department and floundering from day one on administrative issues. On the other hand, there have been many scientists, long abdicating their scientific work, turn into fine administrators and policymakers. It is not uncommon to find IAS secretaries, with excellent reputation, often unable to find their feet in ‘alien’ departments. There is no hard and fast rule in such matters; the suitability and background of each officer for a post is more relevant than his label.

Having said that, it has often been found suboptimal to have a specialist to head a department – say the ministry of energy or ministry of power. By definition, all specialists focus on their own specific fields, and each technical field has a hundred branches. An expert on electrical transmission may not have better advisory capability in the field of solar or hydrogen energy than a non-engineer with an open mind; in most fields rapid development has taken place in the past decades – our expert has learnt his specialty years back, and may be out of date even in his own specialisation. The generalist is not afraid of asking questions, consults many experts before a position is taken – more often than not the specialist tends to take the view that he knows all in his field, and often shuns other opinion.

The author of this piece had occasion recently to prepare a study for the government on two separate fields – environment, and post office reforms. In the area broadly referred to as ‘environment and climate change’, it was an eye-opener to find at least a hundred separate fields of specialisation; often experts and agencies working in one may not be aware even of the existence of many others. Thus, forestry itself has any number of branches – if you add technical, commercial and social forestry issues, the fields of specialisation get multiplied. The arena of pollution – air and water – itself accommodates hundreds of expert fields. The committee that did the study would not have really been able to take a holistic view by talking just to one expert, however renowned – they met over a hundred, to get the picture. Likewise, the issue of postal reform covered a variety of fields – telecom spectrum, optical fibre connectivity, Unique Identity issues, insurance for life / accident / crops, logistics for e-commerce, to mention a few; doubtless, each of these would open up into many more specialised fields of expertise. Thus only an officer with intimate knowledge of the system, with decades of background and experience (needless to say with some imagination, insight and innovation), could bring together different experts to tackle each element of a new strategy. These illustrate the fallacy of repeatedly referring to need to replace ‘generalists’ with ‘specialists’.

The management of public affairs, as practised in India, is a highly specialised field; practitioners have to learn this profession, by working in the field – the university or training institutions will not prepare a person to deal with politicians, crooks, public grievances, riots, floods, policy-making in hundred fields, dealing with the police and the judiciary – none of these is taught in engineering schools or in MBA courses. Robust commonsense, coupled with a sense of dedication, pride, professionalism, and experience from years of working as a field officer and in the secretariat are the key requirements to make an administrator.

Another metaphor may be drawn to make comparison – should a senior citizen, with many ailments not unusual for his age, have only one ‘expert’ doctor as his consultant, or should he rely on a ‘generalist’ doctor? This is not a hypothetical question. A person with high BP and diabetes (standard for most Indians), a weak spine (not unusual for government servants, particularly for those who have one), and poor lung capacity (normal for Delhi citizens, indeed of any city in India) – should he take advice directly from six different experts, without the assistance of a generalist all-round doctor, to interpret, moderate and balance the frequently conflicting ‘expert advice’? This is the role that the professional generalist, with two to three decades of experience is able to play in the system.

The question then may be asked that when the minister himself is a generalist, why one needs a secretary who is also a generalist. The minister is an expert in politics, manoeuvring public opinion, making wild promises, generally shrewd but weak in comprehension of complex issues; without being overly uncharitable, his main management task is to ensure that the ruling party’s political image remains intact; that in most cases, the special interest groups (aka ‘mafias’) that he is beholden to is benefitted; and that everything he does will ensure a good chance of his re-election. Do not be fooled by appellations – our ministers, especially in the states, do not have the same IQ or probity or experience quotient displayed by their counterparts in developed countries; the minister is just not cut out to be an administrator.

The UPSC is a key institution, one of the few which has maintained pristine standards; none has seriously questioned its process of selecting the best candidates for the civil services. The IAS is selected through a competitive examination – not on pass or fail basis; the system is designed to test overall comprehension, analytical ability, and optimal approach to situations, rather than specialisation; it would not make a difference whether a ‘generalist’ or a ‘professional’ is inducted into the service.

The second administrative reforms commission had recommended ‘lateral’ recruitment at the additional secretary and secretary levels. Many, at first sight, may see this as logical. The fact is that even now, at the government of India level, the secretary-level posts are evenly divided among all-India service officers, and experts in their own fields – most of them spending their career in government, rising to the top. Having worked in the system at the secretariat, the ‘expert’ may not have field experience (so essential to any policymaker or administrator whose recommendations / decisions would have impact on the citizen); however, he has understood the governmental system, which itself is highly specialised. Thus an Abdul Kalam or a Kasturirangan, who contributed during their time to governance, were both products of the system; the likes of Montek Singh Ahluwalia also were experts in their own field, but they thrived within the environment of the governmental milieu. It is a moot question whether an outside expert brought in, so to speak cold-turkey, to a line-department like telecom or agriculture or commerce would be able to hit the deck running – he would take at least a couple of years to understand the way decisions are examined and taken within the system, the operation of various institutional factors such as party politics, the judicial system, the  parliament, the CAG and other statutory and constitutional agencies, not to speak of the impact of media or the NGOs or the social media on decision making. This is not to belittle or downplay the role of experts – they are of vital importance to provide high quality technical inputs, and raise the quality of approach to complex issues. Do not downgrade them by asking them to be ‘pen-pushing’ babus.

Do not demean our talented experts to waste their time dealing with inconsequential parliamentary questions. Equally, do not demean the senior professional civil servant, chosen from among the best talent available in India, with two-or-three-decades of relevant experience – he is generally irreplaceable.

One other significant point needs to be highlighted. India has borrowed its administrative structure from Whitehall – not from the US, where each minister is allowed to choose his own senior advisers, who leave their private jobs as experts to join the minister’s team for a five-year stint; in the US they are team members, and identify their personal interests solely with that of the minister. In India such a concept will have disastrous impact – will make a corrupt system infinitely worse, in most situations. In India the governance pattern is ‘adversarial’ – the secretary’s role is to render dispassionate non-partisan advice; he is also responsible, as a career functionary, for the propriety of the advice he tenders. Besides, Indian administration does not have the checks and balances that US has, where most proposals are looked at through committees at different levels. Only a person who does not understand the basics, as well as the complex nature of Indian administrative practice, would trust short-term advisers at the highest levels, who will exercise authority without responsibility. Lateral entry will spell disaster, particularly in states where methods will be found to induct persons with limited expertise but dubious integrity, to loot the system. Again, before lateral entry is considered, there needs to be a clear understanding of what the current gaps are, and how – if at all – lateral entry will fill them.

The present system of postings and transfers is frequently irrational, especially in the states. However, it needs to be ensured that at the additional secretary/ secretary level it will be unwise and counterproductive to post a career civil servant, who does not have previous experience in that broad field. At the level of secretary, there is no time to learn the broad milieu and general features of that particular field, indeed its ‘lingo’; there is no place for people with no previous exposure. Career planning for the services should ensure that the officer posted at the secretary level should have done at least one assignment at deputy secretary / director / joint secretary levels, to give him a sense of familiarity, as also to ensure that he is fully effective from day one.

No one questions the need for reform of the civil service, which ought to be a continuous process, as in every other sphere. Politicisation of the civil services has taken roots. The level of corruption in many civil services has reached worrisome, if not alarming, levels – though miniscule compared to the political arena. The morale of the civil servants themselves is low, particularly in the states. Some, who have little understanding of Indian governance, have even asked whether the time has come to abolish the all-India services.

Don’t throw the baby with the bath water. What is needed is reform, not scrapping the system. Civil servants should be enabled to perform with freedom, efficacy and accountability. For this, one should reach out to tackle the core problems, not just tinker with peripheral issues. The necessary political will has to be summoned, if such a thing were possible, to tone up and cleanse the civil services.

The core problems afflicting the civil services stem from larger political causes, relating to unstable state governments, rampant corruption in the states and operation of mafias, and an insecure political executive exploiting the public servant for narrow personal ends. Politics having become the most lucrative business in the country, with few checks and controls, there is compulsion for the minister or political leader to tempt or coerce civil servants to collude with him for mutual benefit. Frequent transfers, ministers hand-picking the officials to work with them and sidelining of efficient but honest officers are common now, especially in the states.  An array of weapons is used: arbitrary transfers, control over the annual character roll entry, and unleashing of departmental inquiries to keep civil servants off balance and submissive, prodding them to collusion. These are the key issues which need to be addressed, for a meaningful reform.

The main weaknesses in our governance structure do not emanate from the civil services. Currently, the real problems lie elsewhere. The political scene is unprincipled, unscrupulous, and untrammelled – there is no effective check against excesses and delinquency of the political executive. Political reforms should be highest on the agenda. This is possible only if there is significant election reform. Judicial reform, about which much is not yet talked about, also ranks in the forefront. One should avoid the temptation to look for ‘easy’ solutions, barking up the wrong tree – since the civil servant is the easiest target to hit. Half-baked impractical ideas such as lateral entry should not be encouraged – the room for abuse is enormous.

Subramanian is a former cabinet secretary.
(The article appears in the June 16-30, 2015 issue)
Courtesy: http://www.governancenow.com/views/columns/the-perennial-generalist-vs-specialist-debate

Friday, August 18, 2017

INTEGRATED CHILD DEVELOPMENT SERVICES (ICDS) PROGRAMME IN THE CONTEXT OF URBAN POOR AND SLUM DWELLERS IN INDIA: EXPLORING CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES By SANJEEV KUMAR AND SAINATH BANERJEE

The article examines the challenges and issues related to Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS) programme in urban settings with specific reference to urban poor and slum population in India. For example, Anganwadi Centres (AWCs) in slums or in urban areas are confronted with multiple issues ranging from infrastructural constraints (buildings, space, water and sanitation facilities); inadequate rental provision to run the AWC properly; unmapped and unrecognised slums and squatters; left out and drop out; increasing migrant and mobile population; difficulty in identifying and reaching out to migrant and working population; lack of convergence with health and allied departments and local bodies, and inadequate access and poor quality of services ;lack of knowledge and capacity among service providers; absence of an effective primary health care system in urban areas; lack of awareness and community participation, issues of gender and self-identity, etc. Further, the article attempts to explore opportunities and next steps to be taken as suggestive recommendations for ICDS programme that may strengthen the actual implementation of ICDS programme in urban areas.

INTRODUCTION:
INDIA CONTINUES to have the highest rate of malnutrition and the largest number of undernourished children in the world. This is true, in spite of various policies at national and state levels, and the constant efforts of several international and national voluntary organisations, including that of bilateral and donor agencies (Kumar, 2009). Almost 43 per cent of children under five years of age in India are underweight and 48 per cent are reported as stunted (National Family Health Survey (NFHS-3). The urban poor population (including the slums in urban areas) has a high prevalence of under-nutrition as almost 47 per cent of urban poor children are reported to be underweight and 54 per cent as stunted with almost 60 per cent of urban poor children miss total immunisation before completing one year (NFHS-3). Further, the Infant Mortality Rate (IMR) of India, is still considered as high as 40 per 1,000 live births (Sample Registration System (SRS), 2013) while the Under-5 Mortality Rate (U5MR) is as high as 52 per 1,000 live births (SRS, 2012).

India is home to 121 crore people, out of which 37.71 crore people, who constitute 31.16 per cent of total population reside in urban areas. This is for the first time since Independence, that the absolute increase in population is more in urban areas than in rural areas. Urban growth has led to rapid increase in number of urban poor population, many of whom live in slums and other squatter settlements. India is home to the world’s largest child (0-6 years) population of 158.8 million of which 41.2 million reside in urban areas (Census 2011). The child population in urban areas increased by almost 3.9 million (10.32%) as compared to 2001 Census. The Planning Commission, poverty estimate for 2011-12 (based on the Tendulkar method) designates 13.7 per cent (52.8 million) urban population as ‘poor’, i.e. living below the official poverty line (Planning Commission, 2013).

The main purpose of this policy research article is to examine the challenges and issues related to Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS) Programme in urban settings with specific reference to urban poor and slum population in view of growing urbanisation trend in India. Further, this article also attempts to review the effectiveness of ICDS in addressing the challenges around prevalence of child malnutrition. At the same time, the article attempts to explore opportunities and next steps as suggestive recommendation or a way forward that may strengthen the actual implementation of ICDS programme in urban areas with specific reference to slum and urban poor population.

The nutritional status of children has become an important indicator of the development status of the country. Today, ensuring good nutrition is a matter of international law. This is being fully expressed in the Convention on Rights of Child (1989) which specifies that States must take appropriate measures to reduce infant and child mortality and to combat malnutrition through the provision of nutritious foods. The Constitution of India, in Article 47 shares similar concern as it says that “the state shall regard the raising of the level of nutrition and the standard of living of its people and the improvement of public health as among its primary duties and in particular, the state shall endeavour to bring about prohibition of the consumption except for medicinal purposes of intoxicating drinks and of drugs which are injurious to health.” In Article 39 (f) of Constitution there is an emphatic emphasis on children when it says that “children are given opportunities and facilities to develop in a healthy manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity and that childhood and youth are protected against exploitation and against moral and material abandonment”. The commitment of India to the cause of nutrition can be seen from its ratifying the Convention on the Rights of Child and Signing the World Declaration on Nutrition, at the International Conference on Nutrition held in December 1992 at Rome. Many judicial pronouncements in this regard are noteworthy. The Supreme Court's order dated November 28, 2003 in this regard is a glaring example. The court, through that order, had appointed a Commissioner to review government social security schemes.

Historical Perspective: An Overview of ICDS Scheme in India India’s concern to address the needs of children is evident from the First Five-Year Plan itself when the Planning Commission of India adopted a planned approach by introducing child welfare programmes in the country. Since then, various child welfare programmes were introduced related to education, health, nutrition, welfare and recreation in subsequent FiveYear Plans. Special programmes to meet the needs of children with special needs, destitute and other groups of children were also undertaken. Some of these programmes were related to the growth and development of children, especially children belonging to the pre-school age group of below six years. However, such child care programmes with their inadequate coverage and very limited inputs could not make much dent in the problems of children. As comprehensive and integrated early childhood services were regarded as investment in the future economic and social progress of the country, it was felt that a model plan which would ensure the delivery of maximum benefit to the children in a lasting manner should be evolved. Accordingly, a scheme for integrated child care services named as ICDS was initiated for implementation in all states (Lok Sabha Secretariat report, 2011).

Launched on October 2, 1975, ICDS scheme continues to be one of the largest and unique schemes in the world underpinning holistic development of under-six years of children in the country. Being implemented nationwide under the aegis of the Union Ministry of Women and Child Development (MWCD), the scheme is a powerful driving force designed to break the vicious cycle of child malnutrition, morbidity, reduced learning capacity and mortality. The scheme adopts multi-sectoral approach by integrating health; nutrition; water and sanitation; hygiene; and education into one package of services that primarily targets children below six years; women including expectant and nursing mothers; and adolescent girls. The other key element of this scheme is that all the services under ICDS are provided through Anganwadi Centres (AWCs) established at the community level.

While the scheme was launched nationwide, only 42 per cent out of 14 lakh habitations were covered under the scheme by the Ninth FiveYear Plan in the country. With a view to universalising the scheme, the Supreme Court of India in its order of April 29, 2004, and reiterated in its order dated December 13, 2006, has inter-alia, directed the Government of India to sanction and operationalise a minimum of 14 lakh AWCs in a phased and even manner. To comply with the directions of the Supreme Court and to fulfil the commitment of the Government of India (GoI) to universalise the ICDS Scheme, it has been expanded in three phases in the years 2005-06, 2006-07 and 2008-09, so as to cover all habitations, including Scheduled Caste (SC) / Scheduled Tribe (ST) and Minority, across the country (Lok Sabha Secretariat report, 2011).

In pursuance to the order of Supreme Court, rapid universalisation of ICDS has been made across the country. Today, there is near universalisation of ICDS scheme in India, to the extent that the ICDS scheme covers nearly 7067 ICDS projects (99.89%) out of approved 7075 and almost 13.60 lakhs AWCs (97.14%) out of 14 lakh across states of India (MWCD, 2014, Consolidated Report).

While it was essential to universalise ICDS, the rapid expansion resulted into some programmatic, institutional and management gaps that needed redressal. These gaps and shortcomings have been the subject matter of intense discussions at various forums including the mid-term review of the 11th Five-Year Plan. It was felt that the programme needs restructuring and strengthening which was duly endorsed by the Prime Minister's National Council on India's Nutrition Challenges which decided to strengthen and restructure ICDS. Consequently, an InterMinisterial Group (IMG) led by the Member, Planning Commission (In-Charge of WCD), was constituted to suggest restructuring and strengthening of ICDS.

The Inter-Ministerial Group (IMG) after holding consultations with different stakeholders submitted the report on restructuring ICDS in 2011 (Hameed, 2011). Accordingly, the proposal to strengthen and restructure the ICDS scheme through a series of programmatic, management and institutional reforms, changes in norms, including putting ICDS in a Mission Mode was considered and approved by Gol for continued implementation of ICDS Scheme in the 12th Five-Year Plan (MWCD, 2012,). In order to achieve the above objectives, ICDS has repackaged its services (relating to health; nutrition; water and sanitation; hygiene; and education) in an integrated manner with an aim to bring in larger impact on the beneficiaries. The new package of services has six major components; ten services and 52 core interventions (MWCD, ICDS Mission, 2012).

Context and Challenges The Global Context The global population reached seven billion in 2011 and will continue to grow, albeit at a decelerating rate, to reach a projected nine billion in 2050 (United Nations (UN), Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2011). “...For many countries, the current rate of expansion of urban agglomerations has brought about severe challenges for provision of basic services such as adequate housing, water and sanitation systems as well as provision of health clinics and schools. There are many factors specific to life in urban environments which impact household food and nutrition security” [Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), UN, 2010]

The United Nations Standing Committee on Nutrition (UNSCN) statement of 2012, which builds on the 2006 statement (The double burden of malnutrition: a challenge for cities worldwide) clearly reflects its view on nutrition security of urban population when it states that “Now more than half of the global population lives in cities which are therefore hosting more poor... growing urban populations increase vulnerability and the risk of humanitarian crises. All countries, high as well as low- and middle-income countries (LMIC), are experiencing the double burden of malnutrition which is rooted in poverty and inequality. Vulnerable households require social protection, adult education including nutrition education and legal protection to realise and protect optimal nutrition. A wide variety of local innovative initiatives is taking place, both in LMIC as in wealthy nations. But cities need to be empowered to do more, better and now. The UNSCN through this statement of 2012 calls for increased attention, awareness and research on urban nutrition as well as for an effective engagement and Inter-sectoral and Multi-stakeholder collaboration leading to an efficient use of urban resources. Rural-urban linkages need to be enhanced. Successful urban nutrition initiatives need to be better documented and more widely shared” (UNSCN Statement, 2012).

The National Context As per the Census Report of 2011, India is home to 121 crore people, out of which, 37.71 crore people, which constitute 31.16 per cent of total population residing in urban areas. This is for the first time since independence, that the absolute increase in population is more in urban areas than in rural areas. The level of urbanisation has increased from 25.7 per cent in 1991 to 27.81 per cent in 2001 and 31.16 per cent in 2011. In fact, the proportion of rural population, declined from 72.19 per cent in 2001 to 68.84 in 2011 (Census of India, 2011). Within 25 years, another 30-40 crore people are expected to be added to Indian towns and cities (Planning Commission, 2010). The UN estimates that by 2030 about 583 million Indians will live in cities (United Nations, 2014).

Urban growth has led to rapid increase in number of urban poor population, many of whom live in slums and other squatter settlements. As per Census 2011, approx. 6.5 crore people live in slums as compared to 2001 census when 5.24 crore people lived in slums. Out of 4,041 Statutory’ Towns in Census 2011, 2543 Towns (63%) were reported as Slums. The total Slum Enumeration Blocks (SEBs) in Census 2011 is about 1.08 lakh in the country and the largest number of SEBs are reported from the State of Maharashtra (21,359). Out of 789 lakh urban households, almost 137.49 lakh (17.4 % households) live in slums in India. Interestingly, out of these 52 lakh slums household (38.1%) reported to live in Millions Plus Cities, which are 46 in number, across India. The increase in urban poor population including people living in slums is putting greater strain on the urban infrastructure.

Unlike in rural areas, urban poor economy is cash-based making an impoverished urban poor family more vulnerable to food insecurity. Poor environmental conditions in urban slums result in frequent episodes of morbidity, particularly diarrhoea, putting families especially children in a vicious cycle of malnutrition. As many of the urban poor live in temporary settlements and slums not included in the official government lists they are often excluded from basic amenities/government services and they constantly struggle for housing, livelihood and health care. Further, due to long delays in updating official slum lists many often remain unlisted/unrecognised for years. Being unrecognised they are not even entitled to basic health and nutrition services (Agarwal, Taneja, 2005). Improving health outcomes for urban populations is a challenge, particularly for residents of slum areas. In addition to the general level of poverty, unique factors contribute to poor health in urban slums and make the provision of health services in those areas more difficult. These include lack of regular employment, lack of tenure and the threat of eviction, migration, poor access to water and sanitation, extreme crowding, and a host of social issues including discrimination (Kamla Gupta, Fred Arnold, and H. Lhungdim. 2009).

An overview of State-wise ICDS Projects/Anganwadi Centres in Rural and Urban Areas of India:
Though, originally designed to reach rural communities, ICDS now has a substantial presence in urban areas, particularly in poor slum settlements. AWCs are increasingly playing a crucial role in providing health and nutrition services to children and women in the urban landscape. Today, there is near universalisation of ICDS in India, to the extent that the ICDS scheme covers nearly 7067 ICDS projects (99.89%) out of approved 7075 and almost 13.60 lakh AWCs (97.14%) out of 14 lakh across states of India

However, of these, there are just 755 ICDS projects and 11, 7411 AWCs sanctioned for urban areas across the country. The national average of urban ICDS projects in India is just about 11 per cent, whereas the urban population in India has reached up to 31 per cent. In fact, more or less similar is the situation of states except NCT of Delhi, where percentage of urban population is almost 97.50.

Emerging Issues and Gaps (Problem of Health and Undernutrition in Urban Areas) India is home to the world’s largest child (0-6 years) population of 158.8 million (Census 2011), of which 41.2 million reside in urban areas. The child population in urban areas increased by almost 3.9 million (10.32%) while the corresponding rural child population decreased by five million (7.04%) as compared to 2001 Census. Demographic trends indicate that urban areas will see exponential population increase over time. The Child Sex Ratio (0-6) in the country in Census 2011 has declined by 13 points from 927 in 2001. In Rural areas the fall is significant as it has declined by 15 points from 934 in 2001 to 919 in 2011 and in Urban areas the decline is limited to four points from 906 in 2001 to 902 in 2011.

The urban poor suffer from poor health and nutrition status (NUHM, MoHFW, 2013). Almost 43 per cent of children under five years of age in India are underweight and 48 per cent are reported as stunted (NFHS- 3). The urban poor population (including the slums in urban areas) has a high prevalence of under nutrition as almost 47 per cent of urban poor children are reported to be underweight and 54 per cent as stunted with almost 60 per cent of urban poor children miss total immunisation before completing one year (NUHM, MoHFW, 2013; NFHS-3, 2005-06). Further, the Infant Mortality Rate (IMR) of India, is still considered as high as 40 per 1,000 live births (Sample Registration System (SRS), 2013) while the Under-5 Mortality Rate (U5MR) is as high as 52 per 1,000 live births (SRS, 2012).

The Global Hunger Index (GHI) Report, released in October, 2014, has reported that underweight children in India fell by almost 13 percentage points between 2005-06 and 2013-14, this means underweight in children in India stands as 30.7 per cent. India now ranks 55th out of 76 countries, before Bangladesh and Pakistan, but still trails behind neighbouring Nepal (rank 44) and Sri Lanka (rank 39). While no longer in the “alarming” category, India’s hunger status is still classified as “serious”, (GHI, 2014). Even if we go by this figure, this 30.7 per cent is still very high and much has to be done to contain malnutrition in India, without losing our focus from policy perspective. In fact, before arriving at any conclusion based on GHI report on reduction in malnutrition for India, one should also wait for National Family Health Survey-4 (NFHS-4) data to come out by Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (MoHFW) Government of India for clearer policy direction.

The perusal of above data that relate to urban poor for slums and nonslums from cities, namely, Bhubaneswar, Jaipur, and Pune reflects that on an average only 32 per cent of children weights were measured across slums in these cities. Further, more than 60 per cent mothers of these children who were weighed in these slums reported that they have not been counselled. In fact, the issues of mother receiving supplementary nutrition from AWCs is very low, on an average it is just 27 per cent across three cities except Bhubaneswar, where this percentage is 37. The data further reveals that only 42 per cent of children aged 12-23 months were fully immunised across slums in these cities. However, the data shows that on an average about 69 per cent of children were breastfed within an hour of birth of child except Jaipur where this percentage is just 37. Also, on an average more than 85 per cent of children were exclusively breastfed across these cities except Jaipur where the per cent is just 60. Further, almost 62 per cent of married women in these slums reported to have had consumed IFA for 90 days or more, except in Jaipur where this percentage is just 42. On the issue of community interaction with ICDS and Health field functionaries, on an average, about 41 per cent of married women across slums in these cities reported that they had interacted with AWW and ANM at AWCs,

The households in slum areas lack toilet facilities and use open spaces for defecation. For example, almost, 23 per cent of households in Bhubaneswar, 13 per cent in Jaipur and six per cent in Pune do not have toilet facilities and use open spaces for defecation. In fact, on an average only about three per cent of households in these slums across cities reported to have access to water in their own dwelling. However, in Bhubaneswar about 23 per cent, Jaipur, four per cent and Pune, 25 per cent of households in slums reported of getting drinking water from their own yards/plots. In fact, more than two thirds of the households source of drinking water is located elsewhere. Majority of slum households reported to storing of drinking water. (HUP, Baseline Report, 2011, IIPS, Mumbai).

The constraints of space, proper infrastructure, sanitation, town planning without giving adequate provision for childcare plague the functioning of urban ICDS. “The ICDS runs very poorly in urban slums areas, the urban Anganwadis are in terrible conditions... Whether winter or summer, they make the kids sit on a paper-thin durrie and even if they soil themselves they are made to sit like that for hours. All they get is a meal but no personal touch. Most women here who go out for work leave their children with private care providers... In urban slums, the problem of appallingly low rent allocations for hiring of spaces and non-availability of government buildings needs to be addressed urgently to fill the gap in universalising services for slum populations” (Saxena, 2012). Action Aid, a study done in 2010 on the homeless in Chennai and discovered that 66 per cent of children under five years were not availing of ICDS facilities. Many were opting for creches services of private players. The worst affected are those in the unorganised sectors-constructions workers, domestic helps, vendors and so on. They take their children along with them and make them work by pulling them away from schools (Saxena, 2012).

Despite the supposed proximity of the urban poor to urban health facilities their access to them is severely restricted. This is on account of their being “crowded out” because of the inadequacy of the urban public health delivery system. Ineffective outreach and weak referral system also limits the access of urban poor to health care services. Social exclusion and lack of information and assistance at the secondary and tertiary hospitals makes them unfamiliar to the modern environment of hospitals, thus restricting their access. The lack of economic resources inhibits/ restricts their access to the available private facilities. Further, the lack of standards and norms for the urban health delivery system when contrasted with the rural network makes the urban poor more vulnerable and worse off than their rural counterparts (NUHM, MoHFW, 2013)

Poor environmental condition in the slums along with high population density makes them vulnerable to lung diseases like asthma, tuberculosis (TB) etc. Slums also have a high-incidence of vector-borne diseases (VBDs) and cases of malaria among the urban poor are twice as high as other urbanites ((NUHM, MoHFW, 2013). The multiplicity of providers, agencies, and programmes addressing similar developmental issues, often without synergy, is a complexity unique to urban areas, rendering some populations “over reached” and perhaps the most vulnerable populations, “under reached” (Urban Health Initiatives, India, 2012).

Overall urban health and well-being metrics is weak in terms of its ability to highlight inequities within urban areas. Practice of using simple tools to understand deprivations and of spatially mapping inequities and vulnerable pockets is yet to be adequately developed. Despite physical proximity of service delivery points, cities are the locus of inequitable access and reach of healthcare services. There is poor social cohesion and collective self-efficacy to seek essential services among the urban underserved. Coordinated efforts of multiple stakeholders in responding to urban inequities have been limited. While there is growing recognition of the magnitude, growth and significance of urban poverty in India, the response of governments, donors and other agencies in addressing urban health inequities has been lukewarm (Agarwal, Sethi, UHRC, 2012).

An order of Supreme Court dated October 7, 2004, with regards to urban slum and urban ICDS, stated that “Efforts must be made to ensure that all Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (SCs & STs) habitation in the country shall, as early as possible, have operational AWCs. Similar efforts shall also be made to ascertain that all urban slums have AWCs. Further, the order says: “All States and Union Territories shall make earnest efforts to ensure that slums are covered by the ICDS Programme” (Mander, 2012).

Mindful of all these growing problems and complex challenges in urban settings with specific reference to functioning of ICDS programme in urban areas, the MWCD, Gol, in July, 2012, organised a two-day workshop on ‘Strengthening Maternal and Child Care, Nutrition and Health Services in Urban Settings’ attended by senior representatives of the allied department of Gol, several state governments including that of the representatives of Municipal Corporations, NGOs, etc. Probably, these challenges were discussed for the first time at such a national forum comprising of galaxy of participants and experts from different corners of the country. The MWCD during deliberations recognised and acknowledged that urban ICDS is faced with a multitude of constraints and further noted that “in view of multidimensional challenges of providing maternal and child care nutrition and health services in urban settings, there is pressing need for identifying the key issues and to arrive at workable solutions along with short and long term strategies for ICDS programme in urban areas” (Workshop Report, MWCD, NIPCCD, 2012).

However, the recent policy decisions by Central Government with regards to drastic reduction in budget on ICDS and what impact it would have on ongoing ICDS restructuring and strengthening process initiated and mandated under 12th Five-Year Plan period requires some discussion. The budgetary allocation for ICDS scheme this financial year (FY) 15-16, by Gol is reduced to almost 50 per cent as compared to last two financial year period. This financial year, the allocation is just Rs. 8335.7 crore as Gol share, whereas, the budgetary allocation amount for FY 13-14 & FY 14-15 for the ICDS scheme was Rs. 16,312 crore and Rs. 16,561 crore respectively (Press Information Bureau, MWCD reply to Rajya Sabha, March 19, 2015).

The recent decision leading to drastic reductions in ICDS budget may impact the ongoing strengthening and restructuring of ICDS scheme which had already started a series of programmatic, management and institutional reforms, including putting ICDS in Mission mode as envisioned and approved under 12th Five-Year Plan period. Under 12th Five-Year Plan period, the total approved budget allocation for ICDS by Government of India for implementation of restructured and strengthened ICDS scheme in Mission mode was Rs 1,23,580 crore as GoI shares. In addition, the provision of funding from other sources and convergence with other programme/schemes including the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act was agreed to be pursued (MWCD, 2012, letter no.1-8/2012-CD-1, October 22, 2012).

However, Government of India maintains that the reduction in the Budgetary allocations in Financial Year 2015-16 for all planned schemes, including ICDS, have been made against the backdrop of the 14th Finance Commission ‘recommendations of higher devolution of taxes to the tune of 42 per cent of the divisible pool to the states which in their view is much higher than the 32 per cent devolved to states in the previous five years. The GoI argues that this decision is made to give more flexibility to states in implementation of centrally sponsored schemes with higher share from the states (Expenditure Budget, Plan Outlay 2015-2016). But so far states have not come up with clearer response on that as whether they will really enhance their shares to these social schemes or in this case ICDS in line with objectives of restructured and strengthened ICDS and whether they will implement the programme in mission mode as envisioned. Further Gol, should clarify that major activities under restructured and strengthened ICDS that was supposed to be undertaken at central level should be supported with required budgetary allocations to support the rolling out ICDS mission in effective manner.

Interestingly, the perusal of the draft concept note of widely discussed Smart City Scheme suggests that ICDS scheme is not incorporated in Smart City Strategy. Although, there is focus on health, sanitation and social infrastructure in draft proposal but without any reference of ICDS services or tackling of under-nutrition among urban poor and slum settlements (Draft Concept Note on Smart City Scheme, 3-12-14, MoUD, Gol).

Conclusion and Recommendations The foregoing discussion and analysis clearly depicts the challenges that ICDS programme in urban areas is presently confronted with and augur the need to strengthen the ICDS programme in urban areas. The analysis clearly reflects services related to ICDS in urban areas are not without serious limitation and challenges especially in the wake of increase in urban population and slum settlements and inclusion of new areas under urban settings. The discussion also brings forth the gap between the policy intentions of ICDS and its actual implementation at field and raises serious concerns on functioning of ICDS programme in urban areas. For example, the AWCs in slum or in urban areas is confronted with issues ranging from infrastructural constraints for AWCs (buildings, space, water and sanitation facilities, inadequate rental provision to run the AWC properly; unmapped and unrecognised slums and squatters; left out and drop out; increasing migrant and mobile population; difficulty in identifying and reaching out to migrant and working population; lack of convergence with health and allied departments and local bodies, lack of knowledge and capacity among service provider; absence of an effective primary health care system in urban areas; lack of awareness and community participation, issues of gender, self-identity and inadequate access and poor quality of services, etc

In the context of foregoing analysis and objectives of this article, it is important to highlight some recommendations for ICDS programme, in urban areas that have emerged from discussion. Over all, the trend emerging out of this discussion in the form of immediate and intermediate recommendations are summarised in following points: There is a need to think about AWCs cum-day-care centres/Creche in urban settings to facilitate working mothers; establishing mobile AWC; mapping and reallocation of left-out listed slums; use of temporary structures such as Porta Cabins or other temporary structures as AWCs; co-location of AWCs in schools wherever feasible, provision of wage loss to mothers and collective efforts for services like water and sanitation; AWC rent options to be linked to different categories of cities/towns and the rent approved under ICDS restructuring and strengthening under 12th Five-Year Plan should be strictly adhered to; ensure quality of service delivery to urban poor settlements and pockets with focus on highly vulnerable settlements.’ Increased involvement of community in managing and organising AWC activities in urban settings; need for proper capacity building and skill development of ICDS staffs in the context of urban challenges; need for convergence and coordination and multi-sectoral partnership and need for co-micro planning with multisectoral agencies viz. MoHUPA to improve AWC infrastructure; with MoHFW to improve outreach points, mobile service teams, helplines and referral linkage; with community based organisations to improve household counselling and community mobilisation; with NGO partners to manage urban ICDS particularly delivery of supplementary nutrition and Early Child Education; with Urban Local Bodies (ULBs) to implement and monitor ICDS projects. Need for private sectors participation and leverage of CSR funds for strengthening of the ICDS in urban areas.

Further, there is need for the growth-monitoring activities at AWCs to be performed with greater regularity with an emphasis on using this process to help parents understand how to improve their children’s health and nutrition and at the same time the monitoring and evaluation activities need strengthening through the collection of timely, relevant, accessible, high-quality information to inform decision, improve performance, quality and increase accountability.

Addressing the health and nutrition of urban poor children is both a right and an equity issue. In terms of long-term planning, there is an opportunity for policy makers to identify and explore for various localised models and workable solution along with existing best practices keeping in view the strengths of their reliability, which can support urban ICDS programme in effective and meaningful ways. There is pressing need to design and initiate urban pilot interventions aimed at improving the availability, accessibility and quality of child development services to effectively address the nutritional and health concerns in urban setting of the urban poor population

Courtesy: http://www.iipa.org.in/upload/articles_sanjeev.pdf