This article contextualises and locates social sciences in the
wider debate of
research methodology. It goes on to narrow
down its focus to
the discipline of Public Administration by
tracing its
evolution and reaches the conclusion that a Kuhnian
historiography of
a scientific discipline has characterised the
growth of theory
in this discipline since its inception.
INTRODUCTION:
THE METHODOLOGY
behind social science research work invariably
depends on the
philosophical orientation one subscribes to. There are two
philosophical
schools of thought dealt with here, the scientific school that is
geared towards
“generalisability beyond spatio-temporal context” (Mukherji
2000:14) and the
Hermeneutics approach which involves empathic
interpretation of
reality, both have their relative strengths and weaknesses.
Scientific Method
The scientific
school of thought gained from the contributions of Karl
Popper, Thomas
Kuhn and Imre Lakatos. Following are the summarised
versions of the
philosophies and what each thought of others work.
Popper’s
Falsification
The central aspect
of Popper’s theory is that he sees science as a set
of distinct
unconnected theories (DiCicco and Levy 1999) that may be
overturned at
anytime. This he terms as “fallibilism”. (Walker 2010:438)
The strength of a
theory lies in its resilience to withstand falsification rather
that in
verifiability (Mukherji 2000). His concern was not with paradigm
shift as in Kuhn
but on identifying anomalies so as to falsify existing theory.
Hence refutation
is the mark of progress, wherein, dominant and competing
theories are
pitted against each other leading to the development of science.
The two vital
principals of enquiry are thus “avoiding narrow specialisation”
and maintaining a
“highly critical approach.” (Wallcer 2010:439).
To summarise,
Popper criticises Kuhn calling dominant paradigms
and
incommensurability as myths (Walker 2010) and established an open
society
characterised by multiplicity of methodologies and theories, which
ultimately are
conjectures that need to be critically examined and then tested.
The results may
allow for falsification which will either set aside theories
that are
inaccurate or elevate those that can be empirically tested.
The limitations of
this theory are pointed out by Kuhn, who criticises
falsification
stating that, if any and every failure were to fit the grounds for
the rejection of a
theory then all theories would be rejected. (Kuhn 1970)
Kuhn’s
Revolutionary Theories of Scientific Development
Kuhn refutes the
assumption that development of science is a cumulative
process and states
instead that science develops by successive revolutions
from one paradigm
to another. (Kuhn 1970). The interim periods are
characterised by
what Kuhn calls as ‘Normal Science’ during which time
all research and
all scientists are guided by a dominant paradigm, that leads
to narrow and
directed research (Kuhn 1970; Walker 2010).
Paradigms may be
“understood in terms of its life-cycle” (Walker
2010:435) marked
by phases. The pre-paradigm phase is characterised by
debate on
legitimacy of methods, problems and standards of solutions, this
actually helps
define the paradigm. Once the paradigm is assimilated, the
phase of normal
science appears and all decent disappears. Problems that
do not conform to
the paradigm, that is anomalies, are usually ignored. The
concerns of
legitimacy, etc., once more come to the forefront just before
the scientific
revolution (Kuhn 1970), when the dominant paradigm is
first challenged.
This phase is called as the period of crisis at which time
anomalies mount
and an awareness of the same is brought about. There
shall be extensive
studies into the anomalies that lead to discoveries (Wade
1977) and an
alternative paradigm is proposed that ultimately brings on
the revolution.
The scientific
revolution is therefore a “destructive-constructive
paradigm change”
(Kuhn 1970:66) that leads to the development of
science. The
alternative paradigm, however faces a consequent struggle
for acceptance
among the defenders of the old paradigm. This stand off is
ultimately solved
by “non-rational factors” (Wade 1977:144) like persuasion.
The idea of
“incommensurability” (Wade 1977:144) between competing
paradigms that
Kuhn emphasises at this point is central to his theory, as
a new paradigm
does not build on an older paradigm, it only supplants it.
Lakatos ‘s
Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes (MSRP)
Lakatos’s MSRP
closely resembles Kuhn’s theory of paradigmms even
though he
criticised him. To quote Lakatos, “Where Kuhn sees paradigm;
I also see
rational research programmes”. (Walker 2010:436). Lakatos’s
theoretical
framework describes the development of science in terms of
progressive
development or degeneration (Walker 2010; DiCicco and Levy
1999). According
to Lakatos, a science comprises a number of distinct and
competing series
of research programmes (DiCicco and Levy 1999). Within
these research
programmes he identifies certain core entities; they are as
follows (DiCicco
and Levy 1999):
(i) Hard core
assumptions:They are assumptions that are
‘irrefutable’ and
not subject to empirical testing. Researchers
utilise the same
to formulate auxiliary hypothesis;
(ii) Auxiliary
Hypothesis: This is a protective belt around the hard
core assumptions,
drawn from it and are subject to empirical
testing;
(iii) Positive
Heuristic: Research in the programme is guided
by positive
heuristic, which is “a partially articulated set of
suggestions or
hints” (DiCicco and Levy l999: 686).
(iv) Negative
Heuristic: Are those that “delineate the types of
variables and/or
models that ought to be shunned by researchers
within a research
programme because they deviate from the
assumptions of the
hard core” (DiCicco and Levyl999:686).
Lakatos, unlike
Kuhn, focuses on the evaluation of the progressive
nature of science.
(Walker 2010). His criterion for scientific development is
seen in the light
of ‘problemshifts’. Those that are consistent with hard core
assumptions are
termed as intraprogram’ problemshifts and those that violate
the hard core
assumptions are termed as ‘interprogram’ problemshifts and
generally initiate
new research (DiCicco and Levy 1999). Hence scientific
progression has
three criteria:
(i) The alternate
theory must include all “unrefuted” facts of the
previous theory–
“Theory of Subsumption” (Walker 2010:438)
(ii) It must
predict a novel fact;
(iii) The theory
should have additional corroborative evidence over
the previous
theory.
Degenerating or ad
hoc research programmes fail to fulfil the above
criteria. Hence
like Kuhn, Lakatos also looks at the efficient growth of
scientific
knowledge. (Walker 2010). However, a limitation demonstrated
by DiCicco and
Levy is that MSRP fails to elaborate on the progressive
or degenerating
nature of individual projects in a research programme.
(DiCicco and Levy
1999).
Relevance of Kuhn,
Lakatos and Popper to Social Sciences
In discussing
research methodologies social sciences often look to
Kuhn, Lakatos and
Popper for meta-theoretical guides. Kuhn and Lakatos
themselves have,
however, been very critical of this application of their
work.
Nevertheless, Kuhn’s “paradigm mentality based on normal science
and
incommensurability has been widely employed, if not internalised, by
political
scientists.” (Walker 2010:436).
Lakatos is
referred to by DiCicco and Levy as the, “...the metatheorist
of choice”
(DiCicco and Levy 1999:676; Walker 2010). Scholars in many
fields, from
international relations to economics have used MSRP. Unlike
Kuhn and Lakatos,
Popper applied his ideas directly to social sciences.
(Walker 2010) and
his theory of falsification has been seen as being equally
pertinent to
social and as it is to natural sciences.
Hermeneutics
The hermeneutics
approach has widely been applied to social science
studies. Wilhelm
Dilthey and Hans-Georg Gadamar are two profound
thinkers within
this school of thoughts.
Dilthey’s
Hermeneutics as the Foundation of Geisteswissenschaften
Dilthey was of the
opinion that hermeneutics is the foundation of
any discipline
that interprets expressions of man’s life or in other words
Geisteswissenschaften
(humanities). He objected to the adopting of natural
sciences methods
to the study of man and instead wished to establish the
epistemology of
Hermeneutics or a method to study man and understand
him (Palmer 1969).
Understanding is
re-experiencing the thoughts of the author. The bases
of his theory of
understanding are the concepts of utility of life, expression,
and historicality.
• Life is the
complex fusion of feeling and will that is experienced
and needs to be
understood in terms of the context of the past or
history”. Life
must be understood in the experience of life itself
(Palmer 1969:102).
• An expression is
the expression of the inner life of man by
way of art,
language, etc., “in which the spirit of man has been
objectified”
(Palmer 1969:112).
• Historicality or
history can tell man what his nature is today,
though this nature
is not fixed.
This gives rise to
the hermeneutic circle in which understanding is
grasped from the
reciprocal relation or dialogue between the whole (context)
and its parts
(text), with regard to the lived experience of the interpreter or
his historicality.
Or in other words, the interpretation depends on the situation
in which the
interpreter himself stands and hence changes with time.
Gadamar’s
Philosophical Hermeneutics
Hermeneutics to
Gadamar is a philosophical process wherein
understanding is
ontological or a process in man in a culture and history
and is marked by
both universality and historicity. This understanding is
not reached
methodologically as in Dilthey, but through a dialectic process
between tradition
and one’s own self-understanding or prejudgements
(Palmer 1969).
Therefore,
understanding functions through a relation of past, present
and future.
Interpretations are based on not only what one experiences at
present, but on
the tradition of interpretation that existed in the past and the
possibility it
opens for the future. Language is the medium through which
history speaks.
Hermeneutics then is human understanding that is historical,
linguistic and
dialectical. Understanding is not “an act of man but an event
in man” (Palmer
1969:216).
A Case for a
Kuhunian Approach to Public Administration
The publication of
Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
in 1962 provides a
“definite hallmark for identifying paradigm shifts or
revolutions”
(Paine 2002) in fields of study. It enables us to gain a whole
new outlook to the
development of a subject and tempts one to adopt the
same to social
sciences as well. However, this application has its challenges;
Kuhn himself
points to the gap between natural science and social science
(Kuhn, 1970). He
“characterises the social sciences by their fundamental
‘disagreement’
over the ‘nature of legitimate scientific problems and
methods” (Walker
2010:433). Nevertheless, the auther believes that such
an application is
not only possible but also advantageous as it allows for
the identification
of the definite revolutionary ideas that have given new
life to a
discipline over the ages. To illustrate, the author has chosen one
branch of social
science–Public Administration.
Public
administration has developed through a“constellation of facts,
theories and
methods” (Kuhn 1970:1) that have been brought about by a
“piecemeal
process” (Kuhn 1970:1). Be it the contributions of Woodrow
Wilson, Herbert
Simon or Dwight Waldo, each has led the discipline in
different
directions.
Kuhn’s idea is
explained by paradigms that are dominated by a theory.
These paradigms
lead to the establishment of normal science; which is a
period wherein the
dominant theory acts as the basis of research for the rest
of the scientific
community (Kuhn 1970). In public administration, Woodrow
Wilson’s concept
of dichotomy set the tone for the early studies in the field
(Henry 2004) and
characterised the Paradigm of Political/Administrative
Dichotomy (Henry
2004)1887-1926 (Avasthi and Maheshwari 2005), Henry
Fayol’s Industrial
and General Management underpinned the development
that occurred
during The Principles of Administration Paradigm 1927-1937
(Henry 2004), Elton
Mayo’s Hawthorne Experiment influenced the Human
Relations
(Bhattacharya 2004) Paradigm 1920’s-1930’s, Herbert Simon’s
Administrative
Behaviour defined the Behavioural (Bhattacharya 2004)
Paradigm 1938-1947
(Avasthi and Maheshwari 2005), and so on.
When a paradigm is
established it attracts most of the next generation
researchers, who
set out to further articulate it. These works based on the
paradigm do not
overtly disagree with the fundamentals established by
the dominant
theory (Kuhn 1970), as can been seen in the first paradigm
of Public
Administration. All works, from Frank Goodnow’s Politics and
Administration
1900 right up to Leonard D. White’s Introductions to the
Study of Public
Administration 1926, held true to Woodrow Wilson’s
concept of dichotomy
(Henry 2004). This phase of ‘normal science’ Kuhn
states also allows
for detailed and in-depth study, often developing models
and principles
that facilitate the paradigm (Kuhn 1970) as was done by
Luther H. Gulick
and Lyndall Urwick in the Papers on the Science of
Administration,
Mooney and Reiley in Principles of Organisation and W.F.
Willoughby in
Principles of Public Administration (Avasthi and Maheshwari
2005) in the
Paradigm of Principles of Administration. They determined
its significant
facts, matched the facts to theory and applied the same to
the problems of
the time, which are the characteristics that mark Kuhn’s
literature of
normal science (Kuhn 1970).
Ultimately though,
the aim of normal science is puzzle solving (Kuhn
1970) or in other
words, researches set out to solve the problems that
confront the
paradigm. As was done by the thinkers within the Paradigm of
Principles of
Administration, who set out to use the “network of concepts,
methodologies,
(and) theories” (Kuhn 1970:42) of the paradigm to solve
the problem of
effectiveness and efficiency that plague the times (Avasthi
and Maheshwari
2005).
But normal science
does not stay the same. It has an in-built mechanism
to bring about change,
for as it expands the number of novelties or anomalies
tend to increase
(Kuhn 1970). Initially anomalies are ignored; as Mary
Parker Follett’s
Creative Experience 1924 was during the dominance of the
Paradigm of
Principles. (It was only with the coming of the next paradigm,
the Human
Relations approach, that her work was recognised.) But, when
the current
paradigm persistently fails to explain all puzzles the anomalies
can no longer be
ignored.
These anomalies
are results that “violate the paradigm-induced
expectations”
(Kuhn 1970:52-53) and it brings in a period of crisis, where
in extensive
studies into the anomalies occurs. This ultimately leads to the
scientific
revolution. Elton Mayo’s Hawthorne experiments are a notable
example of the
same. The experiments began as an attempt to prove the
efficacy of the
principles that marked the Paradigm of Principles but the
results
demonstrated the influence of the social and psychological factors instead,
shaking the foundation of the principles school of thought
(Bhattacharya
2004). Such cases are termed as discoveries by Kuhn and
lead to
revolutions. The Hawthorn studies led to the establishment of the
human relations
approach which ultimately became the next paradigm.
Hence, initially
only what is expected is observed, gradually an awareness
of an anomaly
occurs; this awareness opens up a period of adjustment till
that time that the
anomaly becomes the basis of the next paradigm and is
anticipated within
it. It is then that the discovery is complete (Kuhn 1970).
After the
discovery of a new paradigm and its assimilation, the
previous paradigm
is discarded. But “The decision to reject one paradigm is
always
simultaneously the decision to accept another” (Kuhn 1970:77) i.e.,
a previous
paradigm is declared as invalid only if an alternative paradigm
is available to
take its place. Hence there is no competition of theories
but a replacement
of the old by an “incompatible” (Kuhn 1970:95) new
paradigm. This was
illustrated in the development of public administration,
when the
discipline was redefined by Herbert Simon (Bhattacharya 2004)
during the
behavioural paradigm. His principle thesis was that there are no
such things as
principles of administration (Avasthi and Maheshwari 2005)
and he called the
principles as “no more than proverbs” (Bhattacharya
2004: 13). He
provided an alternative positivistic approach in dealing with
administrative
challenges, the substantial focus shifting towards ‘decision
making’
(Bhattacharya 2004). These changes are the revolutions that
characterise the
development of the field. In Kuhn’s view one sees this
development as a
cumulative process only when a person “writes history
backwards” (Kuhn
1970:138). Hence, advancement in a field of study is a
succession of
paradigm bound periods, punctuated by revolutionary breaks
(Kuhn 1970).
CONCLUSION
Therefore, as
illustrated above, Kuhn’s scientific revolutions can
quite successfully
be applied to social science. Social scientists in the past
have looked to
Kuhn for methodological guides to develop the discipline
(Walker 2010) and
will continue to do so in the future. As David Truman
in his
presidential address to the American Political Science Association
(APSA) stated, the
application of Kuhn’s concepts of paradigm is a very
helpful means to
regenerate the discipline (Walker 20,0:433). Although
predominantly
philosophical in its emphasis paradigm does not totally
negate
sociological and psychological aspects in science, especially so for
it concerns the numbers
of the community of scientists. Hence it does not
leave a small
window open for humaneneutics.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR:
Lavanya Suresh –
PhD Scholar, CPIGD, Institute for Social and
Economic Change
(ISEC), Bangalore.
CONTENT COURTESY -
IJPA JAN- MARCH 2015
