SITUATING SOCIAL SCIENCES IN THE PHILOSOPHICAL DEBATE ON RESEARCH METHODOLOGY WITH A FOCUS ON PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION - LAVANYA SURESH

This article contextualises and locates social sciences in the

wider debate of research methodology. It goes on to narrow

down its focus to the discipline of Public Administration by

tracing its evolution and reaches the conclusion that a Kuhnian

historiography of a scientific discipline has characterised the

growth of theory in this discipline since its inception.

INTRODUCTION:

THE METHODOLOGY behind social science research work invariably

depends on the philosophical orientation one subscribes to. There are two

philosophical schools of thought dealt with here, the scientific school that is

geared towards “generalisability beyond spatio-temporal context” (Mukherji

2000:14) and the Hermeneutics approach which involves empathic

interpretation of reality, both have their relative strengths and weaknesses.

Scientific Method

The scientific school of thought gained from the contributions of Karl

Popper, Thomas Kuhn and Imre Lakatos. Following are the summarised

versions of the philosophies and what each thought of others work.

Popper’s Falsification

The central aspect of Popper’s theory is that he sees science as a set

of distinct unconnected theories (DiCicco and Levy 1999) that may be

overturned at anytime. This he terms as “fallibilism”. (Walker 2010:438)

The strength of a theory lies in its resilience to withstand falsification rather

that in verifiability (Mukherji 2000). His concern was not with paradigm

shift as in Kuhn but on identifying anomalies so as to falsify existing theory.

Hence refutation is the mark of progress, wherein, dominant and competing

theories are pitted against each other leading to the development of science.

The two vital principals of enquiry are thus “avoiding narrow specialisation”

and maintaining a “highly critical approach.” (Wallcer 2010:439).

To summarise, Popper criticises Kuhn calling dominant paradigms

and incommensurability as myths (Walker 2010) and established an open

society characterised by multiplicity of methodologies and theories, which

ultimately are conjectures that need to be critically examined and then tested.

The results may allow for falsification which will either set aside theories

that are inaccurate or elevate those that can be empirically tested.

The limitations of this theory are pointed out by Kuhn, who criticises

falsification stating that, if any and every failure were to fit the grounds for

the rejection of a theory then all theories would be rejected. (Kuhn 1970)

Kuhn’s Revolutionary Theories of Scientific Development

Kuhn refutes the assumption that development of science is a cumulative

process and states instead that science develops by successive revolutions

from one paradigm to another. (Kuhn 1970). The interim periods are

characterised by what Kuhn calls as ‘Normal Science’ during which time

all research and all scientists are guided by a dominant paradigm, that leads

to narrow and directed research (Kuhn 1970; Walker 2010).

Paradigms may be “understood in terms of its life-cycle” (Walker

2010:435) marked by phases. The pre-paradigm phase is characterised by

debate on legitimacy of methods, problems and standards of solutions, this

actually helps define the paradigm. Once the paradigm is assimilated, the

phase of normal science appears and all decent disappears. Problems that

do not conform to the paradigm, that is anomalies, are usually ignored. The

concerns of legitimacy, etc., once more come to the forefront just before

the scientific revolution (Kuhn 1970), when the dominant paradigm is

first challenged. This phase is called as the period of crisis at which time

anomalies mount and an awareness of the same is brought about. There

shall be extensive studies into the anomalies that lead to discoveries (Wade

1977) and an alternative paradigm is proposed that ultimately brings on

the revolution.

The scientific revolution is therefore a “destructive-constructive

paradigm change” (Kuhn 1970:66) that leads to the development of

science. The alternative paradigm, however faces a consequent struggle

for acceptance among the defenders of the old paradigm. This stand off is

ultimately solved by “non-rational factors” (Wade 1977:144) like persuasion.

The idea of “incommensurability” (Wade 1977:144) between competing

paradigms that Kuhn emphasises at this point is central to his theory, as

a new paradigm does not build on an older paradigm, it only supplants it.

Lakatos ‘s Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes (MSRP)

Lakatos’s MSRP closely resembles Kuhn’s theory of paradigmms even

though he criticised him. To quote Lakatos, “Where Kuhn sees paradigm;

I also see rational research programmes”. (Walker 2010:436). Lakatos’s

theoretical framework describes the development of science in terms of

progressive development or degeneration (Walker 2010; DiCicco and Levy

1999). According to Lakatos, a science comprises a number of distinct and

competing series of research programmes (DiCicco and Levy 1999). Within

these research programmes he identifies certain core entities; they are as

follows (DiCicco and Levy 1999):

(i) Hard core assumptions:They are assumptions that are

‘irrefutable’ and not subject to empirical testing. Researchers

utilise the same to formulate auxiliary hypothesis;

(ii) Auxiliary Hypothesis: This is a protective belt around the hard

core assumptions, drawn from it and are subject to empirical

testing;

(iii) Positive Heuristic: Research in the programme is guided

by positive heuristic, which is “a partially articulated set of

suggestions or hints” (DiCicco and Levy l999: 686).

(iv) Negative Heuristic: Are those that “delineate the types of

variables and/or models that ought to be shunned by researchers

within a research programme because they deviate from the

assumptions of the hard core” (DiCicco and Levyl999:686).

Lakatos, unlike Kuhn, focuses on the evaluation of the progressive

nature of science. (Walker 2010). His criterion for scientific development is

seen in the light of ‘problemshifts’. Those that are consistent with hard core

assumptions are termed as intraprogram’ problemshifts and those that violate

the hard core assumptions are termed as ‘interprogram’ problemshifts and

generally initiate new research (DiCicco and Levy 1999). Hence scientific

progression has three criteria:

(i) The alternate theory must include all “unrefuted” facts of the

previous theory– “Theory of Subsumption” (Walker 2010:438)

(ii) It must predict a novel fact;

(iii) The theory should have additional corroborative evidence over

the previous theory.

Degenerating or ad hoc research programmes fail to fulfil the above

criteria. Hence like Kuhn, Lakatos also looks at the efficient growth of

scientific knowledge. (Walker 2010). However, a limitation demonstrated

by DiCicco and Levy is that MSRP fails to elaborate on the progressive

or degenerating nature of individual projects in a research programme.

(DiCicco and Levy 1999).

Relevance of Kuhn, Lakatos and Popper to Social Sciences

In discussing research methodologies social sciences often look to

Kuhn, Lakatos and Popper for meta-theoretical guides. Kuhn and Lakatos

themselves have, however, been very critical of this application of their

work. Nevertheless, Kuhn’s “paradigm mentality based on normal science

and incommensurability has been widely employed, if not internalised, by

political scientists.” (Walker 2010:436).

Lakatos is referred to by DiCicco and Levy as the, “...the metatheorist

of choice” (DiCicco and Levy 1999:676; Walker 2010). Scholars in many

fields, from international relations to economics have used MSRP. Unlike

Kuhn and Lakatos, Popper applied his ideas directly to social sciences.

(Walker 2010) and his theory of falsification has been seen as being equally

pertinent to social and as it is to natural sciences.

Hermeneutics

The hermeneutics approach has widely been applied to social science

studies. Wilhelm Dilthey and Hans-Georg Gadamar are two profound

thinkers within this school of thoughts.

Dilthey’s Hermeneutics as the Foundation of Geisteswissenschaften

Dilthey was of the opinion that hermeneutics is the foundation of

any discipline that interprets expressions of man’s life or in other words

Geisteswissenschaften (humanities). He objected to the adopting of natural

sciences methods to the study of man and instead wished to establish the

epistemology of Hermeneutics or a method to study man and understand

him (Palmer 1969).

Understanding is re-experiencing the thoughts of the author. The bases

of his theory of understanding are the concepts of utility of life, expression,

and historicality.

• Life is the complex fusion of feeling and will that is experienced

and needs to be understood in terms of the context of the past or

history”. Life must be understood in the experience of life itself

(Palmer 1969:102).

• An expression is the expression of the inner life of man by

way of art, language, etc., “in which the spirit of man has been

objectified” (Palmer 1969:112).

• Historicality or history can tell man what his nature is today,

though this nature is not fixed.

This gives rise to the hermeneutic circle in which understanding is

grasped from the reciprocal relation or dialogue between the whole (context)

and its parts (text), with regard to the lived experience of the interpreter or

his historicality. Or in other words, the interpretation depends on the situation

in which the interpreter himself stands and hence changes with time.

Gadamar’s Philosophical Hermeneutics

Hermeneutics to Gadamar is a philosophical process wherein

understanding is ontological or a process in man in a culture and history

and is marked by both universality and historicity. This understanding is

not reached methodologically as in Dilthey, but through a dialectic process

between tradition and one’s own self-understanding or prejudgements

(Palmer 1969).

Therefore, understanding functions through a relation of past, present

and future. Interpretations are based on not only what one experiences at

present, but on the tradition of interpretation that existed in the past and the

possibility it opens for the future. Language is the medium through which

history speaks. Hermeneutics then is human understanding that is historical,

linguistic and dialectical. Understanding is not “an act of man but an event

in man” (Palmer 1969:216).

A Case for a Kuhunian Approach to Public Administration

The publication of Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions

in 1962 provides a “definite hallmark for identifying paradigm shifts or

revolutions” (Paine 2002) in fields of study. It enables us to gain a whole

new outlook to the development of a subject and tempts one to adopt the

same to social sciences as well. However, this application has its challenges;

Kuhn himself points to the gap between natural science and social science

(Kuhn, 1970). He “characterises the social sciences by their fundamental

‘disagreement’ over the ‘nature of legitimate scientific problems and

methods” (Walker 2010:433). Nevertheless, the auther believes that such

an application is not only possible but also advantageous as it allows for

the identification of the definite revolutionary ideas that have given new

life to a discipline over the ages. To illustrate, the author has chosen one

branch of social science–Public Administration.

Public administration has developed through a“constellation of facts,

theories and methods” (Kuhn 1970:1) that have been brought about by a

“piecemeal process” (Kuhn 1970:1). Be it the contributions of Woodrow

Wilson, Herbert Simon or Dwight Waldo, each has led the discipline in

different directions.

Kuhn’s idea is explained by paradigms that are dominated by a theory.

These paradigms lead to the establishment of normal science; which is a

period wherein the dominant theory acts as the basis of research for the rest

of the scientific community (Kuhn 1970). In public administration, Woodrow

Wilson’s concept of dichotomy set the tone for the early studies in the field

(Henry 2004) and characterised the Paradigm of Political/Administrative

Dichotomy (Henry 2004)1887-1926 (Avasthi and Maheshwari 2005), Henry

Fayol’s Industrial and General Management underpinned the development

that occurred during The Principles of Administration Paradigm 1927-1937

(Henry 2004), Elton Mayo’s Hawthorne Experiment influenced the Human

Relations (Bhattacharya 2004) Paradigm 1920’s-1930’s, Herbert Simon’s

Administrative Behaviour defined the Behavioural (Bhattacharya 2004)

Paradigm 1938-1947 (Avasthi and Maheshwari 2005), and so on.

When a paradigm is established it attracts most of the next generation

researchers, who set out to further articulate it. These works based on the

paradigm do not overtly disagree with the fundamentals established by

the dominant theory (Kuhn 1970), as can been seen in the first paradigm

of Public Administration. All works, from Frank Goodnow’s Politics and

Administration 1900 right up to Leonard D. White’s Introductions to the

Study of Public Administration 1926, held true to Woodrow Wilson’s

concept of dichotomy (Henry 2004). This phase of ‘normal science’ Kuhn

states also allows for detailed and in-depth study, often developing models

and principles that facilitate the paradigm (Kuhn 1970) as was done by

Luther H. Gulick and Lyndall Urwick in the Papers on the Science of

Administration, Mooney and Reiley in Principles of Organisation and W.F.

Willoughby in Principles of Public Administration (Avasthi and Maheshwari

2005) in the Paradigm of Principles of Administration. They determined

its significant facts, matched the facts to theory and applied the same to

the problems of the time, which are the characteristics that mark Kuhn’s

literature of normal science (Kuhn 1970).

Ultimately though, the aim of normal science is puzzle solving (Kuhn

1970) or in other words, researches set out to solve the problems that

confront the paradigm. As was done by the thinkers within the Paradigm of

Principles of Administration, who set out to use the “network of concepts,

methodologies, (and) theories” (Kuhn 1970:42) of the paradigm to solve

the problem of effectiveness and efficiency that plague the times (Avasthi

and Maheshwari 2005).

But normal science does not stay the same. It has an in-built mechanism

to bring about change, for as it expands the number of novelties or anomalies

tend to increase (Kuhn 1970). Initially anomalies are ignored; as Mary

Parker Follett’s Creative Experience 1924 was during the dominance of the

Paradigm of Principles. (It was only with the coming of the next paradigm,

the Human Relations approach, that her work was recognised.) But, when

the current paradigm persistently fails to explain all puzzles the anomalies

can no longer be ignored.

These anomalies are results that “violate the paradigm-induced

expectations” (Kuhn 1970:52-53) and it brings in a period of crisis, where

in extensive studies into the anomalies occurs. This ultimately leads to the

scientific revolution. Elton Mayo’s Hawthorne experiments are a notable

example of the same. The experiments began as an attempt to prove the

efficacy of the principles that marked the Paradigm of Principles but the

results demonstrated the influence of the social and psychological factors instead, shaking the foundation of the principles school of thought

(Bhattacharya 2004). Such cases are termed as discoveries by Kuhn and

lead to revolutions. The Hawthorn studies led to the establishment of the

human relations approach which ultimately became the next paradigm.

Hence, initially only what is expected is observed, gradually an awareness

of an anomaly occurs; this awareness opens up a period of adjustment till

that time that the anomaly becomes the basis of the next paradigm and is

anticipated within it. It is then that the discovery is complete (Kuhn 1970).

After the discovery of a new paradigm and its assimilation, the

previous paradigm is discarded. But “The decision to reject one paradigm is

always simultaneously the decision to accept another” (Kuhn 1970:77) i.e.,

a previous paradigm is declared as invalid only if an alternative paradigm

is available to take its place. Hence there is no competition of theories

but a replacement of the old by an “incompatible” (Kuhn 1970:95) new

paradigm. This was illustrated in the development of public administration,

when the discipline was redefined by Herbert Simon (Bhattacharya 2004)

during the behavioural paradigm. His principle thesis was that there are no

such things as principles of administration (Avasthi and Maheshwari 2005)

and he called the principles as “no more than proverbs” (Bhattacharya

2004: 13). He provided an alternative positivistic approach in dealing with

administrative challenges, the substantial focus shifting towards ‘decision

making’ (Bhattacharya 2004). These changes are the revolutions that

characterise the development of the field. In Kuhn’s view one sees this

development as a cumulative process only when a person “writes history

backwards” (Kuhn 1970:138). Hence, advancement in a field of study is a

succession of paradigm bound periods, punctuated by revolutionary breaks

(Kuhn 1970).

CONCLUSION

Therefore, as illustrated above, Kuhn’s scientific revolutions can

quite successfully be applied to social science. Social scientists in the past

have looked to Kuhn for methodological guides to develop the discipline

(Walker 2010) and will continue to do so in the future. As David Truman

in his presidential address to the American Political Science Association

(APSA) stated, the application of Kuhn’s concepts of paradigm is a very

helpful means to regenerate the discipline (Walker 20,0:433). Although

predominantly philosophical in its emphasis paradigm does not totally

negate sociological and psychological aspects in science, especially so for

it concerns the numbers of the community of scientists. Hence it does not

leave a small window open for humaneneutics.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR:

Lavanya Suresh – PhD Scholar, CPIGD, Institute for Social and

Economic Change (ISEC), Bangalore.

CONTENT COURTESY - IJPA JAN- MARCH 2015